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The protection of human rights in Europe is vital today. In relation to e.g. the handling of 
asylum seekers coming in to the continent, or the dealing with the ever-increasing population 
of the elderly, human rights are at the core of the considerations. Further, when combating 
terrorism on European territory, it may also be a challenge to maintain human rights in the 
process.  
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1   Introduction  
1.1   Theme  and  issue  
The theme of this thesis is the relationship between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (“the EU Charter”)1 and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”).2 This relationship is relevant within the Contracting Parties to the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area (“EEA”).3 This includes the European Union (“EU” or “the 
Union"”) and its Member States on the one hand, and the EEA and those EFTA States that are 
Contracting Parties to the Agreement (“the EEA EFTA States”) on the other. This division is 
necessary considering the differences in scope, content and purpose of the EU Treaties 
compared to the EEA Agreement. 
The content of the EU Charter is heavily influenced by the ECHR, but also differs from it and 
guarantees protection for several additional rights. Since the EU Charter and the ECHR have 
an overlapping area of application within the EU States and both guarantee human rights, it is 
interesting to compare the two to examine how they coexist. In addition, the coming into 
existence of the Charter – and its application to the EU Member States only – entails that 
human rights are possibly regulated differently among the EEA States. It is therefore of 
interest to also look at the relationship between the EU Charter and the ECHR in relation to 
fundamental rights in the EEA.  
The objective of this thesis is twofold; partly it is to present the factors that define and affect 
the relationship between these fundamental rights in the EU and in the EEA Area on a 
European level (Chapter 2); partly it is to highlight the differences in protection guaranteed 
under each catalogue (Chapter 3). In the process the author hopes to provide grounds for 
further thought and consideration on this subject. 
                                                
1  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and  Freedoms  of  the  European  Union  [2012]  OJ  C  326/02  
2  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  (1953).  
3  Agreement  on  the  European  Economic  Area  [1994]  OJ  L  1/1.  
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This thesis is limited by its form and does therefore unfortunately not include a lengthy 
discussion about in what way the presented rules and other relevant factors in fact do affect 
the relationship between the ECHR and the EU Charter. 
The presentation of factors is not exhaustive, as there is an immense amount of literature and 
legislation relating to this subject. In the following the focus is on the rules within the EU 
primary legislation, the ECHR and the EEA Agreement. As for case law, it is limited to a 
select number of decisions from the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the ECJ”), 4 the 
European Court of Human Rights (“the ECtHR”) and the EFTA Court. An extensive 
presentation of decisions by national courts of the Contracting Parties is largely missing due 
to space restrictions and their relative unimportance when interpreting the international rules.  
1.2   Historic  and  legal  context  
For the purposes of this thesis, it is beneficial to have an overview over the main participants 
in the development and application of the ECHR and the EU Charter. In the following there 
will be an introduction to the Council of Europe, the EU and the EEA, as well as the EU 
Charter and the ECHR. It is important to note that these frameworks have been developed 
within two different legal systems. Still, action made by participants within one system may 
have a direct or indirect effect upon the participants within the other.  
1.2.1   The  Council  of  Europe  and  the  ECHR  
The Council of Europe (“CoE”) was established in 19495 by 12 European countries. It aims to 
‘achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing 
the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and 
social progress’.6 
                                                
4  The  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  is  still  often  used  to  describe  all  three  courts  of  the  European  
Union,  namely  the  Court  of  Justice,  the  General  Court  and  any  specialized  court  currently  in  function.  
It  was  renamed  the  CJEU  by  the  Lisbon  treaty  cf.  Art  19(1)  TEU.  In  line  with  that  renaming  the  term  
”ECJ”  is  in  this  thesis  used  as  a  reference  only  to  the  highest  of  these  courts,  the  Court  of  Justice.    
5  See  Statute  of  the  Council  of  Europe  (ETS  1949)  and  Jacobs,  White  &  Ovey,  The  European  
Convention  on  Human  Rights  (6th  edn,  OUP  2014)  4.  
6  Statute  (n  5)  Art.  2(a).  
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There are 47 CoE Member States, including all the 28 EU Member States and the three EEA 
EFTA States.7 In addition, there are five States with observer status.8 The CoE consists of 
three organs: The Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Congress of 
Local and regional Authorities of Europe. 
The CoE drafted the ECHR and this entered into force in 1953.9 With the ECHR, the CoE 
aimed to create a tool to prevent in the future such human rights violations as committed 
during the Second World War, and a set of rules to protect against communism overtaking 
Europe and the threat to democracy that could entail.10  
The ECHR established a court, the ECtHR,11 which may make decisions regarding ‘all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols 
thereto’.12 The ECtHR has played a major part in the development of the ECHR through its 
dynamic interpretation of the various provisions. This can be illustrated by the fact that the 
ECtHR considers the ECHR to be a ‘living instrument’ that ‘must be interpreted in the light 
of present-day conditions’.13 
The ECHR was inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)14 and thus 
contains rights of a mainly civil and political nature, although there are a few exceptions.15 
Unlike the UDHR, the ECHR is binding upon its signatories. It follows from Art. 1 ECHR 
                                                
7  Statute  (n  5)  Art.  26.  
8  Council  of  Europe,  ’Our  Member  States’  http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-­us/our-­member-­states  
accessed  9  March  2017.  The  observer  States  are  the  Holy  See,  Japan,  Mexico,  Canada  and  the  
United  States.  
9  Jacobs,  White  &  Ovey  (n  4)  4.  
10  Ibid  3.  
11  ECHR  (n  2)  Art.  19.  Originally  the  Convention  established  a  Commission  of  Human  Rights  as  well  
as  a  Court  of  Human  Rights.  However,  these  were  replaced  by  a  single  European  Court  of  Human  
Rights  by  an  amendment  in  1998,  thus  simplifying  the  process  of  procedure  for  filing  a  complaint  
about  an  alleged  breach  of  the  ECHR.    
12  Art.  32(1)  ECHR.  
13  Tyrer  v.  The  United  Kingdom,  App  no  5856/72  (ECtHR,  25  April  1978)  para  31.  
14  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  (1948).  
15  Such  as  the  right  to  assembly  (Art.  11),  the  protection  for  property  (Protocol  1  Art.  1),  the  right  to  
education  (Protocol  1  Art.  2),  safeguards  relating  to  expulsion  of  aliens  (Protocol  7  Art.  1)  and  equality  
between  spouses  (Protocol  7  Art.  5).  
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that the Contracting Parties commit themselves to securing the rights and freedoms defined in 
the first section of the ECHR for all people within their jurisdiction. 
The ECHR consists of three sections; the first contains the specific rights and freedoms 
protected by it, section II is devoted to the establishing and functioning of the ECtHR, while 
the last section contains miscellaneous provisions on the functioning and application of the 
Convention system. Furthermore, there are six additional Protocols to the ECHR, as well as a 
few amending Protocols. The additional Protocols are nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13, and contain 
additional rights and freedoms to the ECHR. Today, all the EEA States are Contracting 
Parties to the ECHR, however not all Contracting Parties have ratified all Protocols.   
1.2.2   The  European  Union  and  the  Charter  
The EU is a cooperation between 28 countries, usually referred to as the “EU Member 
States”. They have transferred certain powers to the organs of the EU in a wide range of 
areas, including competence to adopt legislation and decisions with legal force in the Member 
States.  
The EU cooperation started out as three international agreements regarding European trade in 
the years after World War II, signed by six European States.16 Each of these three treaties 
established organs to manage the application of the provisions contained in them. The Union 
became what it is today via a gradual development connected to the expanding co-operation 
between its signatories.  
Through a series of amendment treaties, the organs established by the three original treaties 
were merged to promote efficiency. The court, the ECJ, was formed to decide on the 
application and interpretation of the Treaties. Since the early 90s, the cooperation through the 
three treaties was renamed “the European Communities” (also referred to as “the first pillar”), 
whereas “the European Union” was used to describe the full cooperation, also including the 
new aspects of the organisation (formerly referred to as the second and third pillar). With the 
amendments made by the Lisbon Treaty,17 the term ‘Community’ was abandoned, as that part 
of the cooperation was fully integrated into the collective cooperation that is “the Union”. 
                                                
16  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxebmourg  and  the  Netherlands.  
17  Treaty  of  Lisbon  amending  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  and  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  
Community  [2007]  OJ  C  306/01,  cf.  the  EU  Charter  (n  1).  
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Today the Treaties that constitute the European Union are the Treaty on the European Union 
(“TEU”)18 and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).19  
There were no provisions guaranteeing human rights in the original treaties.20 As the co-
operation developed and extended to include more vast areas of law, some Member States 
began questioning whether human rights protected in their constitutions were in peril when 
the State itself was bound by legislation made by a supranational organisation that did not 
take human rights into consideration.21 An important point that heightened the stakes for the 
Member States was that EU law has primacy over the Member States’ domestic law.22 
A series of cases came up before the ECJ, notably Cases 29/26 Stauder,23 11/70 
Handelsgesellschaft24 and 4/73 Nold,25 in which the protection for human rights within the 
Community was challenged. The ECJ stated that respect for fundamental rights ‘form an 
integral part of the general principles of law’26 protected by the ECJ, and that the Court is 
bound to draw ‘inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the Member States’.27 
Further, it stated that ‘international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines 
which should be followed’.28 An example of such an international treaty is the ECHR. The 
first time the ECJ referenced the ECHR was in the 1975, in Case 36/75 Rutili.29 In 1986 the 
                                                
18  Treaty  on  the  European  Union  [2012]  OJ  C  326/13.  
19  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  [2012]  OJ  326/47.  
20  See  Case  1/58  Friedrich  Storch  &  Cie  v  High  Authority  of  the  ECSC  [1959]  ECR  I-­17,  p.  26  section  
4a  &  b.  The  Court  rejected  the  applicant’s  submission  that  fundamental  rights  enshrined  in  Member  
States’  constitutions  were  relevant  when  interpreting  Community  law.    
21  See  especially  the  German  Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof’s  case  Solange  I  [1974]  BVerfGE  37.    
22  The  ECJ  laid  down  the  doctrine  of  supremacy  in  Case  6/64  Costa  v  ENEL  [1964]  ECR  I-­585,  and  
extended  it  to  include  supremacy  over  national  constitutional  rules  in  Case  11/70  Internationale  
Handelsgesellschaft  mbH  v  Einfuhr-­  und  Vorratsstelle  für  Getreide  und  Futtermittel  [1970]  ECR  I-­1126.    
23  Case  29/69  Erich  Stauder  v  City  of  Ulm  [1969]  ECR  I-­419.  
24  Handelsgesellschaft  (n  22).  
25  Case  4/73  Nold  v  Commission  [1974]  ECR  I-­491.  
26  Handelsgesellschaft  (n  22)  para  4.  
27  Nold  (n  25)  para  13.  
28  Nold  (n  25)  para  13.  
29  Case  36/75  Roland  Rutili  v  The  Minister  for  the  Interior  [1975]  ECR  I-­1219  para  32.  
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German Constitutional Court stated in the Solange II case that it considered the fundamental 
rights protection of the EU to be acceptable according to national standards, and that the 
Court would no longer accept complaints alleging Community law failed to comply with 
fundamental rights.30 
In the 90s, the EU had gained the character of a constitutional order,31 and thus it was 
considered necessary for it to have its own bill of fundamental rights. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union was solemnly proclaimed by the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission in 2000.32 It was not to be legally binding upon 
the Member States. Along with the European Parliament and the European Commission, 
representatives from the governments of the Member States and their national parliaments 
prepared the Charter,33 and national constitutions presumably have had an impact on its 
contents.  
Although the EU Charter was not binding initially, the ECJ still sporadically referenced it,34 
the first time being in a case from 2006.35 The EU Charter became legally binding by the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, on 1 December 2009.36 The Charter consists of seven 
titles: I Dignity, II Freedoms, III Equality, IV Solidarity, V Citizen’s Rights, VI Justice and 
VII General Provisions Governing the Interpretation and Application of the Charter.  
1.2.3   The  European  Economic  Area  
The Agreement on the European Economic Area (the “EEA” or the “Agreement”) is an 
agreement between the three non-EU States Iceland, Luxembourg and Norway and the EU 
and its Members States. It came into force on 1 January 1994, and consists of 129 Articles, 22 
annexes and 49 Protocols.  
                                                
30  Solange  II  [1986]  BVerfGE  73.  
31  See  Draft  Treaty  Establishing  a  Constitution  for  Europe  [2003].  
32  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  [2000]  OJ  C  364/01.    
33    The  EU  Network  of  Independent  Experts  on  Fundamental  Rights,  Commentary  of  the  Charter  of  
Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  (June  2006)  15.  
34  Grainne  De  Búrca,  ’After  the  EU  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights:  The  Court  of  Justice  as  a  Human  
Rights  Adjudicator?’  (2013)  20  MJECL  168,  169.  
35  Case  C-­540/03  European  Parliament  v.  Council  of  the  European  Union  [2006]  ECR  I-­5769,  para  25.  
36  Treaty  of  Lisbon  (n  17),  cf.  the  EU  Charter,  bottom  of  final  page.  
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The primary objective of the Agreement is to include the EEA EFTA States in the internal 
market of the EU on equal terms as the EU Member States, without making them EU Member 
States.37 Further, the Parties to the EEA Agreement have not transferred any legislative 
powers to supranational organs, thus preserving their autonomy.38 
With the entry into force of the Agreement, an institutional framework was established to 
control compliance within the EEA.39 Several institutions were formed in what is referred to 
as the “EFTA-pillar”,40 which mirrors the EU institutions in a smaller scale. In this pillar we 
find inter alia the EFTA Court, which fulfils the judicial function in the EFTA pillar and 
works in parallel with the CJEU.41 In addition, the institutional framework includes common 
EEA-organs, which constitute the bridge between the EU- and the EFTA-pillar and is made 
up of organs consisting of representatives from both pillars.  
The EFTA Court is mainly competent to deal with infringement actions brought by the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority against an EEA EFTA State regarding the implementation, application 
or interpretation of EEA law rules, for giving advisory opinions to courts in the EEA EFTA 
States on the interpretation of EEA rules and for appeals concerning decisions taken by the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority.42 
The EEA has a dynamic character,43 which means that it is meant to develop continuously 
over time in accordance with relevant EU law.44 This is natural since EU law, as shown 
above, is continuously developing. The EEA Agreement must keep up with the EU 
development for the Agreement to function. As the EEA EFTA States are not EU Member 
States, they do not participate in the legislative process of the EU, even on those rules that are 
                                                
37  Utenriksdepartementet,  EU/EØS-­håndboken  2016  (Utenriksdepartementet  2016)  7.  
38  Se  Protocol  35  on  the  Implementation  of  EEA  Rules  the  EEA  Agreement  [1994].  
39  See  EEA  Agreement  Part  VII.  
40  Fredrik  Sejersted,  Finn  Arnesen,  Ole-­Andreas  Rognstad  &  Olav  Kolstad  ’EØS-­rett’  
(Universitetsforlaget  2011)  34.  
41  Agreement  between  the  EFTA  States  on  the  Establishment  of  a  Surveillance  Authority  and  a  Court  
of  Justice  [1994]  OJ  L  344/3.  
42  The  EFTA  Surveillance  Authority  has  supervisory  tasks  comparable  to  those  of  the  Commission.  
See  the  EEA  Art.  108(1)  and  (2)  and  the  Surveillance  and  Court  Agreement  Articles  27-­41.  
43  EEA  preamble  paragraph  4.  
44  Sejersted,  Arnesen,  Rognstad  &  Kolstad  (n  40)  87.  
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going to be binding on them. However, they may contribute by giving expert consultation or 
other inputs in the preparatory stage.45 Once the whole legislative procedure is finalised and 
the EU has adopted a new act, the EEA Committee has competence to decide to incorporate it 
into the EEA Agreement via Art. 102 EEA.  
Interestingly, despite the dynamic character of the secondary legislation of the EEA 
Agreement, the main part of the EEA has not been changed since it was signed.  
Closely linked to the dynamic character of the EEA is its principle of homogeneity,46 which is 
also a central aspect of the Agreement. This principle entails that the EEA rules shall be 
interpreted the same way in all the European Economic Area and that the EEA rules shall be 
interpreted the same way as the EU rules from which they derive.47 
1.3   Human  Rights  
The ECHR and the EU Charter both protect human rights. Although most people have a 
conception of what human rights are at their core, it is safe to say that it is a term of unclear 
boundaries.  
The ECHR contains mainly civil and political rights, which have been classified as first 
generation human rights.48 Rights of a social, cultural and economic character have been 
classified as second generation human rights, and several rights of this classification have 
been included in the EU Charter.  
The classification of human rights in ‘generations’ does not reveal much about the human 
rights in question, but generally, the first generation of human rights comes before the second 
in a developing society, as the second generation includes obligations on a State which 
                                                
45  Utenriksdepartementet  (n  37)  8.  
46  Art.  1  EEA  cf.  the  preamble  recital  4  and  16.  
47  Sejersted  (n  40)  87.  
48  This  is  a  classification  coined  by  Karel  Vasak,  a  terminology  that  seems  to  have  been  widely  
endorsed.  See  Karel  Vasak  ‘A  30  Year  Struggle’  [1977]  The  Unesco  Courier  29,  page  29.  However,  
there  are  diverging  classifications  out  there,  e.g.  Aall  classifies  political  rights  as  second  generation  
human  rights,  see  Jørgen  Aall,  Rettsstat  og  menneskerettigheter  (4th  edn,  Fagbokforlaget  2015)  23.  
This  thesis  will  adhere  to  the  classification  of  Vasak,  as  this  is  popularly  accepted.    
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require economic resources and an active State49 taking responsibility for its citizens’ 
wellbeing.50  
There is also a third generation of human rights, called ‘rights of solidarity’.51 Such rights 
include ‘the right to development, the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced 
environment, the right to peace and the right to ownership of the common heritage of 
mankind’.52 This type of human rights is characterized by the fact that they require co-
operation on a community level, i.e. pose obligations on individuals and states as well as on 
public and private institutions.  
It should be mentioned that European human rights do not necessarily represent a universal 
human rights standard, as culture and point of view vary on the different continents.53  
1.4   Relevance  
The treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009. Consequently, the status of the EU Charter as 
legally binding is relatively fresh. Before the treaty of Lisbon there was no codified human 
rights framework generally applicable within the EU. The ECJ operated with general 
principles of law in the area of human rights, based to a large degree on the ECHR.  
As will be described in Chapter 2, the introduction of the EU Charter and the elevated status it 
was granted through the Lisbon Treaty created uncertainty as to the interaction between the 
two main human rights frameworks in Europe within the EU. Now the ECJ has developed its 
own, more autonomous doctrines on human rights, and deals with questions not yet raised in 
the ECtHR.54 This fact puts into question of the relevance of the ECHR as the leading 
                                                
49  Vasak  (n  49)  29.  Vasak  describes  the  second  generation  of  human  rights  as  ‘positive’,  in  that  they  
require  action  from  the  State.    
50    Aall  (n  49)  23.  Aall  describes  stages  of  development  of  a  society  in  three  steps,  from  a  
constitutional  State,  via  a  democracy,  to  a  welfare  State,  and  draws  a  connection  to  what  generation  
of  human  rights  are  guaranteed  in  the  State.    
51  Vasak  (n  50)  29.  
52  Ibid.  
53  Aall  (n  49)  22.  
54  Sybe  de  Vries,  Ulf  Bernitz  and  Stephen  Weatherill  (eds)  The  EU  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  as  
a  Binding  Instrument:  Five  Years  Old  and  Growing  (Hart  Pubilshing  2015)  53  
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European human rights court within the EU, when the EU Charter contains several additional 
rights. Is there a need for an update of the ECHR?  
Within the EU organs the question is how the EU Charter shall be applied and interpreted to 
protect the interests of the Union and of human rights and freedoms and at the same time 
harmoniously coexist with the ECHR.  
For the EU Member States, there is now an increased number of rules which must be taken 
into consideration when interpreting and applying human rights. There might be uncertainty 
as to how the two human rights frameworks relate to each other in the way of hierarchy and 
content. Further, Member States are under an obligation to ensure that its legislation is in 
accordance with EU legislation, which in turn must not violate the EU Charter. In fact, 
violation of the EU Charter’s legal norms by secondary EU legislation can lead to annulment 
of the latter according to Art. 263 TFEU.  
At the same time, and as will be elaborated on in Chapter 2, the EU Member States have an 
obligation to act according to the ECHR, which in turn has a great influence on the EU 
Charter. It is evident that there is a strong connection between the ECHR and the EU Charter, 
illustrated by the several references to the ECHR within EU primary legislation. But the fact 
remains that the systems in which legally binding interpretation is made of these frameworks, 
are quite different. This might lead to differences in the level of protection afforded by each 
framework, and to questions about which standard should be applied.  
How to solve an accession by the EU to the ECHR is also a relevant topic at the time of 
writing. Recently, a draft accession agreement was deemed incompatible with the EU system 
by the ECJ. An accession to the ECHR could be beneficial because the EU has grown to be a 
supranational institution that deals with vast areas of law, and yet there is no external human 
rights control of the EU’s actions. However, following the statements in the ECJ’s opinion on 
the draft agreement, there are significant challenges that need to be overcome before an 
accession may take place.55  
                                                
55  See  Opinion  2/13  of  the  Court  (18  December  2014)  EU:C:2014:2454.  
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For the EEA EFTA States, who are closely connected to substantial parts of EU law, a 
question brought on by the changes by the Lisbon treaty is how the EU Charter affects the 
EEA Agreement and the EEA EFTA States’ obligations under it.  
1.5   Method  
As this thesis is written in English, the method of reference used is the Oxford University 
Standard for the Citation of Legal Authorities (“OSCOLA”).56 This is done to create a better 
flow within the thesis.  
The discussed legislation is mostly international, which has significance for the method of 
interpretation. In cases where the same rules apply over a vast area of law and for many 
different states, there is a need for the Courts to monitor compliance with said rules to afford 
the states a certain margin of appreciation. This is necessary for pragmatic reasons such as the 
functioning of the systems and because in many cases, the states themselves are better to 
assess the legal situation within the state.  
The legislative processes are also different in the ECHR, the EU Charter and in domestic 
systems and this has an impact on the interpretation method. Considerations of the 
accessibility of the rules and the predictability for those who are obliged by and have their 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR and the EU Charter may entail that documents produced in 
the legislative process do not have the same weight when interpreting international rules as 
for instance the importance of preparatory papers when interpreting Norwegian domestic law.  
The fact that there are many different countries that are bound by the ECHR and the EU 
Charter, and that the texts of the frameworks exists in several languages57 means that the 
wording of the Articles should not be relied upon too heavily. Articles should instead be 
interpreted in light of the purpose of the provisions and case law. For this reason, case law 
from the ECJ and the ECtHR is an important source when interpreting the Articles of the 
frameworks, and the preambles should be taken into consideration as well. 
                                                
56  https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/oscola_4th_edn_hart_2012.pdf  accessed  9  March  2017  
57  For  the  ECHR.  Only  the  English  and  the  French  are  official,  but  unofficial  versions  in  other  
languages  exist.  
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When reading decisions by the ECJ, one should be aware of the lack of dissenting opinions, 
which may lead to unclear wording as a result of a compromise between the judges. The 
judgments by the ECtHR however, have a form that allows for dissenting opinions by the 
judges and may therefore present a more nuanced picture of the considerations made.  
When interpreting international rules, it is necessary to be aware of the existence of generally 
applicable principles of international law, such as those derived from the Vienna 
Convention.58 Such principles are, however, not mandatory, unless the Parties involved have 
bound themselves by ratifying the Convention or by other means. One principle relevant to 
this theme is the principle that treaty provisions should be interpreted in light of the object 
and purpose of the treaty.  
The angle of this thesis will be theoretical, since the format and time limit do not allow for a 
satisfactory discussion of the important sides of the theme. Thus, to obtain a well-rounded 
thesis the discussion on de lege ferenda will be limited.  
2   Legal  framework  and  case  law  on  the  relationship  
between  the  EU  Charter  and  the  ECHR  
2.1   Introduction  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the original Treaties constituting the European Community did 
not contain provisions on human rights, and inclusion of protection for human rights into the 
EC legislation became necessary to maintain and develop the Community. The ECJ looked 
toward the ECHR for guidance, as well as the Member States’ constitutional human rights.59 
The influence of the ECHR is evident in that several of the provisions of the Charter resemble 
                                                
58  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Treaties  (1969).  
59  See  Nold  (n  25)  para  13,  where  the  ECJ  stated  that  the  Court  is  ’bound  to  draw  from  constitutional  
traditions  common  to  the  Member  States’  when  determining  the  content  of  EU  human  rights.  The  ECJ  
also  acknowledged  that  international  treaties  on  which  the  Member  States  have  collaborated  or  of  
which  they  are  signatories  may  supply  guidelines  for  the  ECJ.    
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or almost replicate provisions from the ECHR. Furthermore, the ECJ has stated that the 
ECHR has ‘particular relevance’ for the content of EU fundamental rights.60  
When looking at the relationship between the ECHR and the EU Charter, a good place to 
begin is in the rules and regulations that specifically regulate the relationship between the two 
frameworks. Such rules may be found within EU legislation or within the ECHR, or failing 
that, in relevant international law. In addition to that, there will be an examination of relevant 
case law from the ECJ, the ECtHR and the EFTA Court. 
2.2   Within  EU  law  
2.2.1   Pre  Lisbon  –  Art.  F(2)  Maastricht  Treaty  
Before the amendments made by the Lisbon Treaty,61 Art. F(2) of the Treaty on European 
Union (“the Maastricht Treaty”)62 regulated the relationship between the EU and the ECHR. 
This provision corresponds largely to the current consolidated version of Art. 6(3) TEU.  
Article F(2) stated that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law. With the amendments made by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the provision became justiciable by the ECJ regarding actions of the institutions 
of the EU.63 
This provision elevated the ECHR and the Member States’ constitutional human rights above 
other sources of human rights from which the EU could draw inspiration. Since all the EU 
Member States were Contracting Parties to the ECHR, this was not problematic, and it was 
even natural that the ECHR should be a central source of EU human rights. Consequently, the 
ECHR has been very important in the development of EU human rights.64 
                                                
60  See  Joined  Cases  46/87  and  227/88  Hoechst  AG  v  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  
[1989]  ECR  I-­2863,  para  13.  
61  Treaty  of  Lisbon  (n  17).  
62  Treaty  on  European  Union  (Treaty  on  Maastricht)  [1992]  OJ  C  191.  
63  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  Amending  the  Treaty  on  European  Union,  the  Treaties  Establishing  the  
European  Communities  and  Certain  Related  Acts  (2  October  1997),  Art.  L  letter  d.  
64  H.  -­J.  Blanke  and  St.  Mangiameli  (eds),  The  Treaty  on  European  Union  (TEU):  A  Commentary  
(Springer-­Verlag  2013)  294,  para  10.  
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The reference in Art. F(2) to constitutional traditions common to the Member States, was a 
way of incorporating human rights into EU law prior to the EU Charter. In relation to the 
ECHR, the fact that Member States’ constitutions have been given the same importance in 
this provision shows that EU fundamental rights have a somewhat different point of view than 
the ECHR, and emphasizes the autonomy of EU fundamental rights. 
2.2.2   The  TEU  
The Lisbon Treaty65 made amendments to Art. 6 TEU that are significant to both the ECHR 
and to the EU Charter. After the amendments, Article 6(3) TEU66 now addresses the status of 
the ECHR within EU law. Its content corresponds to that of Art. F(2) of the Maastricht Treaty 
and does not bring about any changes in the status of the ECHR in EU law.  
Article 6(1) TEU made the EU Charter legally binding and granted it the same legal value as 
the Treaties.67 The EU Charter having the same legal value as the Treaties means that 
secondary EU legislation must be in accordance with the EU Charter and that Member States 
and EU organs must implement such legislation in accordance with the Charter.  
The status of the EU Charter is now elevated to a status within the EU that the ECHR has not 
reached. Furthermore, the EU Charter has the highest rank within the EU hierarchy, which 
gives it a strong power of impact within the EU. The EU Charter becoming legally binding 
has probably rendered Art. 6(1) less important than before when the EU did not have its own 
human rights catalogue. However, the provision still has legal value and assures the 
‘maintenance of the fundamental rights protection standard as it was developed in the ECJ’s 
case law’ according to Grabenwarter and Pabel.68 In any case the provision is a demonstration 
of how important the ECHR has been in the development of the fundamental rights of the EU. 
2.2.3   Opinion  2/94  
Article 6(2) TEU obliges the EU to accede to the ECHR, using the phrase ‘shall accede to’. 
This provision was included in the TEU by the Lisbon Treaty, pursuant to an opinion by the 
ECJ on the accession of the EU to the ECHR, where it stated that the Union lacked 
                                                
65  Treaty  of  Lisbon  Art.  3b(8).  
66  The  amended  version  of  Art.  F.  
67  The  Treaty  on  European  Union  &  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  see  TEU  
Art.  1(3).  
68  Blanke  &  Mangiameli  (eds)  (n  65)  335,  para  91.  
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competence to accede to the ECHR.69 Now the Union has both competence and an obligation 
to accede, and an accession agreement was drafted in 2013. However, the ECJ gave in 2014 
another Opinion70 stating that the draft accession agreement was not compatible with Art. 
6(2) TEU or the annexed Protocol 8.71 
At the time of writing, the EU is still not party to the ECHR, but the obligation to accede 
remains. There is reason to argue that this obligation strengthens the influence of the ECHR 
within the EU, since it would be counterproductive toward the obligation laid down in the 
TEU for the EU’s organs to act in a way that would make future accession more difficult. As 
pointed out by Grabenwarter and Pabel, the obligation to take measures to ensure the carrying 
out of tasks which ‘flow from the Treaties’, also befalls the Member States of the EU via Art. 
4(3) TEU on the principle of sincere cooperation.72  
2.2.4   The  EU  Charter  
Article 6(1) TEU states that the EU Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with provisions 
in Title VII of the Charter and with “due regard” to the Charter Explanations, which is an 
official document intended to explain the Articles of the EU Charter, (the “Explanations”).73 
The EU Charter itself contains regulations with influence on the relationship between the 
Charter and the ECHR. Within the provisions of the EU Charter, Art. 52(3) describes the 
relationship between the Charter and the ECHR, and states:  
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be 
                                                
69  Opinion  2/94,  Accession  by  the  Community  to  the  European  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  
Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  [1996]  ECR  I-­  01759  para  6.  
70  Opinion  2/13  (n  56).  
71  Protocol  (No  8)  relating  to  Article  6(2)  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  on  the  accession  of  the  
Union  to  the  European  Convention  on  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  
(26  October  2012)  OJ  C  326/1.  
72  Blanke  &  Mangiameli  (eds)  (n  65)  311,  para  43.  
73  Explanations  relating  to  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  [2007]  OJ  C  303/17.  This  document  was  
created  by  the  Praesidium  of  the  Convention  which  drafted  the  EU  Charter  in  2000.    
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the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection.74 
All the rights contained in the ECHR have a corresponding right within the EU Charter.75 It 
should also be noted that the Explanations regarding the EU Charter Art. 52(3) states that the 
meaning and scope are to be determined by both the ECHR and its Protocols as well as case 
law of the ECtHR and the ECJ.76 This means that those EU Member States that have not 
ratified all the ECHR Protocols, may find their human rights obligations to be dictated by 
ECHR Protocol provisions that they have deliberately avoided. This fact could be an 
argument for the ECJ not relying upon provisions of Protocols that not all EU Member States 
have ratified, as suggested by Advocate General Cruz Villalón.77 However, it seems that de 
lege lata grants the relevant provisions of the ECHR Protocols the same status as those 
provisions of the ECHR that have been ratified by all Member States. 
The fifth recital of the preamble of the EU Charter says that the Charter shall be interpreted 
with ‘due regard to the explanations’, referring to the Explanations. It is also stated in the 
preamble that the Charter ‘reaffirms […] the rights as they result, in particular, from the […] 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human 
rights’.  
Since neither the preamble to the EU Charter nor the Explanations are legally binding, there is 
no obligation rising from the EU Charter to take into consideration case law from the ECtHR 
when determining the meaning and scope of Charter rights which are also guaranteed by the 
ECHR. However, the inclusion of a reference to ECtHR case law is in line with the EU policy 
of having respect for the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the ECHR.78 
The second part of Art. 52(3) of the EU Charter allows for the EU protection of human rights 
to be more extensive than that of the ECHR, even in those cases where the meaning and scope 
of the rights otherwise shall be the same. This provision asserts the human rights standard of 
                                                
74  Added  highlight.  
75  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner  &  Ward  (eds)  ’The  EU  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights:  A  Commentary’  (Hart  
Publishing  2014)  1527  section  53.11.  
76  Explanations  (n  74)  17,  third  paragraph.  
77  Case  C-­617/10  Fransson  [2013]  EU:C:2013:105  paragraphs  [71]-­[87].  
78  See  e.g.  that  the  ECHR  rights  are  considered  general  principles  of  EU  law  according  to  Art.  6  TEU  
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the ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR, as the minimum permitted within the EU, where the 
same rights are protected in both frameworks.  
Article 52(4) of the EU Charter is based on Art. 6(3) TEU79 and states that in so far as the 
ECJ recognises rights as they result from common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States, they shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions. In cases where those rights 
are also protected by the ECHR there is a possibility for conflict, as the ECJ is obliged to 
interpret the right to have the same meaning and scope as laid down in the ECHR, but also in 
harmony with Member States’ constitutions. In such cases of conflict, the EU Charter Art. 
52(3) affords a solution, entailing that the source offering the best protection will prevail. It 
should be noted that if the interpretation deriving from Member States’ constitutions is 
applied, it is not applied directly as a national rule, but as a Charter provision interpreted in 
light of such national rules.  
The EU Charter Art. 52 should be read in light of Art. 53 on the level of protection. This 
Article states that nothing in the Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting human rights as recognised in inter alia EU law, Member States’ constitutions and 
the ECHR. In relation to the relationship between the EU Charter and the ECHR, this Article 
prevents any situation where the ECHR provisions might be interpreted restrictively in light 
of any right contained in the Charter. 80 Compared to the EU Charter Art. 52(3), it does not 
add much on the relationship between the Charter and the ECHR.81 
The scope of application of the EU Charter is mainly laid down in Art. 51 on the “Field of 
application”. This provision has relevance toward the ECHR in that, outside of EU law, the 
                                                
79  Explanations  (n  74)  18.  
80  See  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner  &  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  1527  section  53.11.  De  Witte  points  out  that  in  a  
situation  where  an  EU  Charter  right  which  is  also  guaranteed  by  the  ECHR  may  be  restricted  by  the  
interpretation  of  a  different  Charter  right  which  does  not  have  a  corresponding  protection  in  the  ECHR,  
Art.  53  prohibits  such  restriction  on  the  ECHR  right.    
81  Article  53  is  thus  examined  further  in  Chapter  3.  
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Charter will not apply and presumably the ECHR will be of greater importance for the EU 
Member States.82 This provision is more thoroughly considered in Chapter 3.  
2.3   Within  the  EEA  
2.3.1   The  formal  status  of  the  two  frameworks  in  the  EEA  
As far as the EEA EFTA States are concerned, their link to the EU Charter is hinged on their 
relationship with the EU through the EEA Agreement. As mentioned above, all EEA EFTA 
States are Parties to the ECHR, which means that the relationship between the EU Charter 
and the ECHR is relevant within the EEA. The EEA Agreement does of course not regulate 
the relationship between the two human rights frameworks, but it might say something about 
their status within the EEA.  
The EU Charter is not formally binding within the EEA, as it has not been included in the 
Agreement. Neither is there any provision guaranteeing protection for human rights on a 
general basis in the EEA. However, recital 1 of the Preamble to the EEA states that it aims to 
achieve ‘a Europe based on peace, democracy and human rights’, thus showing that human 
rights do have a place within the EEA. Further, fundamental rights relating to non-
discrimination based on nationality and on equal rights for the genders are included in the 
provisions of the EEA.83  
Despite the ECHR being binding upon the EEA EFTA States, it is not formally binding on the 
EEA organs, since they are not Parties to the Convention.  
2.3.2   Homogeneity  and  the  dynamic  character  of  the  EEA  
In relation to the EU, Art. 1(1) EEA states the objective of ‘creating a homogeneous European 
Economic Area’, which is connected to the reference in the preamble recital 4 to the objective 
of establishing a dynamic and homogenous EEA. In line with this objective, Article 6 EEA 
and Art. 3 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement,84 which are materially identical, state 
that the provisions of the Agreement which in substance correspond to EU law, shall be 
                                                
82  See  the  Commission’s  Annual  Report  on  the  Charter  (2015)  23,  fourth  section.  It  states  here  that  
outside  situations  relating  to  EU  law,  Member  States  are  alone  in  ensuring  that  their  obligations  
regarding  fundamental  rights  are  respected.    
83  See  Arts  4,  69  and  70  EEA.  
84  Surveillance  and  Court  Agreement  (n  41).  
 
Page 19 of 63 
interpreted in conformity with the relevant case law of the EU Courts, given prior to the date 
of signature of the EEA.  
It should be noted that this time-limitation in practise has been eliminated by the EFTA Court, 
which puts emphasis on the principle of homogeneity when it states that it has ‘consistently 
taken into account the relevant rulings of the CJEU given after the said date’.85 Consequently, 
all ECJ case law that is relevant for the EEA must be taken into regard, regardless of the time 
it was handed down.  
In Chapter 3 EEA there are rules to ensure homogeneity within the EEA States and between 
the EEA and the EU. Article 102(1) EEA concerns the objective of homogeneity and a 
dynamic EEA. It obliges the EEA Joint Committee to make amendments of Annexes of the 
Agreement ‘as closely as possible’ to the adoption of the relevant provision by the EU. This 
provision does not encompass the Main Part of the EEA. 
It could be argued that the EU Charter contains provisions that are relevant to the EEA 
Agreement in that they are meant to apply to all areas of EU law. However, EU law is not 
entirely the same as EEA law. Furthermore, one of the objectives of the EEA Agreement is 
that it is not supposed to be the same as the EU, but a way of including the EEA EFTA States 
into the internal market of the EU without them being bound by all other EU legislation.  
All the EEA EFTA States and citizens are, contrary to the EEA organs, bound by the ECHR 
and are thus sufficiently regulated according to the ECtHR. Fløistad points toward the fact 
that there is no legislative process within the EEA as there is in the EU, since all EEA 
legislation is made in the EU. Thus, there is not a corresponding need for the EEA organs to 
be bound by a human rights framework.86  
References to the EU Charter are included within some of the EU legislation falling under the 
EEA Agreement.87 In such cases, the EFTA Court and the EEA EFTA States must figure out 
how to apply the particular legislation while respecting the principle of homogeneity.  
                                                
85  Joined  Cases  E-­9/07  and  E-­10/07,  L’Oréal  [2008]  (1  July  2008  EFTA),  para  28.  
86  Karin  Fløistad  'Fundamental  rights  and  the  EEA  Agreement'  (2000)  ARENA  Report  1,  37.  
87  See  for  instance  Council  Directive  (EU)  2010/24  concerning  mutual  assistance  for  the  recovery  of  
claims  relating  to  taxes,  duties  and  other  measures  [2010]  OJ  L84/1,  preamble  recital  21.  
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2.4   In  the  ECHR  
Since the ECHR is an older framework than the EU Charter, naturally there are no rules 
within the Convention directly regulating its relationship to the EU Charter. However, some 
rules may have an impact on the relationship, and the Charter is mentioned in the amended 
Art. 59(2) ECHR.  
As amended by Protocol 14 Art 17, Art 59(2) ECHR allows for the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR by stating that ‘[T]he European Union may accede to this Convention’. This Article 
makes an exception for the EU, as it is not a State, to accede the ECHR. As concluded by a 
CDDH report in 2002, further modification to the ECHR would be necessary before the EU 
may become a Contracting Party to it. However, these changes could be done by an amending 
Protocol or through an accession treaty between the EU and the ECHR Contracting Parties.88  
Further, Art. 1 ECHR obliges the Contracting Parties to secure everyone the rights of the 
Convention. This includes an obligation to not enter into treaties that will oblige the Party to 
violate any Convention right. Although this rule does not regulate the relationship between 
the two frameworks, it is relevant because it entails that, if the EU does not match the 
minimum standards of the ECHR, it would be a violation of Art. 1 for the Contracting Parties 
to be EU Members.89  
2.5   Case  law  
2.5.1   The  ECtHR  
The Bosphorus90 case, concerning a violation of the ECHR right to peaceful enjoyment of 
property, illustrates how the ECtHR considers its position in relation to the EU Charter. The 
question in the case was whether a confiscation of a leased Yugoslavian aircraft in Ireland, 
authorized by a EC Regulation, constituted a violation. Prior to the judgment by the ECtHR, 
                                                
88  Report  adopted  by  the  Steering  Committee  for  Human  Rights(CDDH)  ’Study  of  technical  and  legal  
issues  of  a  possible  EC/EU  accession  to  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights’  (28  June  2002)  
DH-­II(2002)006  [2002]  Chapter  II.  
89  M  &  Co  v  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  App  no  13258/87  (Commission  Decision  9  February  
1990),  note  32  at  8.  
90  Bosphorus  Hava  Yollari  Ve  Ticaret  Anonim  Sirketi  v  Ireland  App  no  45036/98  (ECtHR  30  June  
2005).  
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the ECJ had decided on the same question and found that the limitations made on the right 
were justified and that there was no human rights violation.91 The ECtHR on the other hand, 
concluded that there had been a violation of the ECHR. 
The ECtHR stated that EU Member States remain individually responsible for compliance 
with the ECHR where competence has passed to the EU, but the ECtHR would only interfere 
where the protection afforded by the EU was not equivalent to that provided under the ECHR. 
Equivalence was regarded as comparability rather than congruence and the ECtHR would 
only interfere if it thought the protection within EU was ‘manifestly deficient’.92 
Thus, the ECtHR laid down a rule on when it will interfere with the Parties’ implementation 
of EU law. The rule contains two criteria: first, that the protection afforded within the EU is 
less extensive than within the ECHR and second, that such protection is manifestly deficient. 
Inherent in this is that there is a presumption for that EU law is equivalent with the ECHR 
protection and this presumption has been called the “Bosphorus presumption”.93  
In the recent case of Avotins, the ECtHR reiterated two conditions for the application of the 
Bosphorus presumption.94 There may be no margin of appreciation for the national authorities 
in the implementation of the EU legislation, and the supervisory mechanisms provided for by 
the EU must have been exhausted.95 If these are not fulfilled, the Party of the case will not 
benefit from the Bosphorus presumption.  
Such a high threshold for interfering in EU law could be undesirable since it endangers 
human rights that should be guaranteed by the ECHR. If the EU accedes to the ECHR, such a 
special treatment compared to the other Parties would not sit well, even in the light of the 
uniqueness of the EU, as it weakens the protection of human rights.  
The first time the ECtHR mentioned the charter in a case before it was, as far as the author 
                                                
91  See  Case  C-­84/95  Bosphorus  AS  v  Ireland  [1996]  ECR  I-­3953,  paras.  19-­27.  
92  Bosphorus  (n  92),  paras.  154-­155.  
93  See  e.g.  Avotins  v  Latvia  App  no  17502/07  (ECtHR  23  May  2016)  para  73.  
94  Ibid.  
95  Avotins  (n  94)  para.  105.  
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could find, in a dissenting opinion in Frette v France in 2002.96 It was only mentioned once 
as a supporting argument.  
Case A and B v Norway97 concerned an alleged breach of the ne bis in idem rule of Art. 4 
Protocol 7 ECtHR, made by the Norwegian authorities. In interpreting the content of the rule, 
the ECtHR referred to landmark case law from the ECJ, and statements made by an Advocate 
General in the relevant case.98 This shows a hermeneutical approach by the ECtHR, in that it 
interprets the provision of the ECHR in light of the interpretation of the provision of the EU 
Charter that is based on the ECHR provision in question. The decision illustrates how the EU 
Charter may influence the ECHR. It is also interesting to note that Norway is not an EU 
Member State, and thus not bound by the EU Charter, and yet the decision in a case against 
the State was informed by EU case law on fundamental rights.  
There are several examples of the ECtHR referring to the EU Charter when interpreting the 
content of ECHR rights.99 This is a display of the respect the ECtHR has for the EU 
fundamental rights, and helps ensure more homogeneity within European fundamental rights 
protection. It is also beneficial for those relying on fundamental rights of the EU Charter that 
the ECtHR does not stray away from the interpretations of the ECJ, thus obliging the latter to, 
in accordance with the EU Charter Art. 52(3), avert from its previous case law.  
2.5.2   The  ECJ  
The ECJ has affirmed that in cases falling outside the scope of the EU Charter,100 where the 
fundamental right in question is enshrined in the ECHR, it is for the national court or the 
ECtHR to examine whether there has been a fundamental rights violation “in the light of” the 
relevant ECHR right.101 The ECJ has also confirmed that derogation from the rights of the 
                                                
96  Frette  v  France  App  no  36515/97  (ECtHR  26  February  2002),  joint  partly  dissenting  opinion  of  
Judge  Sir  Nicolas  Bratza  and  Judges  Fuhrman  and  Tulkens,  para  2b.  
97  A  and  B  v  Norway  App  nos  24131/11  and  29758/11  (ECtHR  15  November  2016).  
98  Ibid  paras.  51-­52  and  118.  
99  See  i.e.  Ibrahim  and  Others  v  the  United  Kingdom  App.  Nos.  50541/08,  50571/08,  50573/08  and  
40351/09  (ECtHR  13  September  2016);;  Tarakhel  v  Switzerland  App.  no.  29217/12  (ECtHR  4  
November  2014);;  Magyar  v  Hungary  App.  no.  18030/11  (ECtHR  18  November  2016).  
100  EU  Charter  Art.  51(1).  
101  Case  C-­256/11  Dereci  and  Others  v  Bundesministerium  für  Inneres  [2011]  ECR  I-­11316,  para.  72.  
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Charter is within the scope of EU law.102 Thus, regulations by Member States within the 
scope of EU law must comply with the ECHR, also if the regulation constitutes a derogation.  
In case C-617/10 Fransson,103 the ECJ stated categorically that the ECHR ‘does not 
constitute, if the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been 
formally incorporated into [EU] law’.104 A consequence of this is that the examination of 
questions regarding EU law must be ‘undertaken solely in the light of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter’.105 Thus, the ECJ cannot refer to the ECHR when making its 
decisions. This does not preclude the Court from referencing the ECHR when interpreting the 
EU Charter, but the decision may not be based on the ECHR directly.  
When the ECJ applies EU Charter rights that correspond to the ECHR, it refers to the EU 
Charter Art. 52(3) and the ECHR (with case law) during the interpretation stage, before 
referring to the principle laid down in Fransson and basing its judgment solely on the EU 
Charter right.106 
The Case C-399/11 Melloni107 was a preliminary ruling regarding whether the EU Charter 
Art. 53 could be interpreted as allowing a Member State to limit EU Charter rights for the 
benefit of national constitutional rights. Art. 53 also concerns the ECHR and this case is thus 
relevant to the relationship between the frameworks.  
The ECJ stated that national constitutions may not, based on Art. 53, be given priority above 
the EU Charter if this means that other rights protected in the Charter are undermined. As 
grounds for this the ECJ referred to the principle of primacy of EU law, which would 
otherwise be undermined, and that allowing such limitations would entail ‘casting doubt on 
the uniformity of the standard of protection of fundamental rights’ and ‘undermine the 
                                                
102  See  Case  C-­260/89  ERT  [1991]  ECR  I-­2925,  paras.  44  and  45.  
103  Åkerberg  Fransson  (n  78)  
104  Ibid  para  44.  
105  Case  C-­601/15  J.  N.  [2016]  EU:C:2016:84  paras.  45-­46.  
106  See  e.g.  Case  C-­279/09  DEB  [2010]  ECR  I-­13849;;  Case  C-­601/15  J.  N.  [2016]  EU:C:2016:84.  
107  Case  C-­399/11  Stefano  Melloni  v  Ministerio  Fiscal  [2013]  EU:C:2013:107.  
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principles of mutual trust and recognition’ and therefore ‘compromise the efficacy of that 
framework decision’.108  
The ECJ’s arguments on this could be transferred to the ECHR. Although presumably the risk 
of differences in in protection between the EU Charter rights and the ECHR is smaller than 
between the former and different national Constitutions,109 the rule according to the Melloni 
case is that the EU Member States cannot rely on the ECHR to make limitations on EU 
Charter rights. Whether this is the intention of the ECJ is to be clarified in future case law.   
Case C-157/14 Neptune110 illustrates how the ECJ may handle a case concerning a Charter 
Article which does not correspond to the ECHR, in that case Art. 16 on the right to conduct a 
business. The case concerned the right to write certain slogans on a product according to the 
EU Charter Arts. 11 and 16, and Art. 10 ECHR, which corresponds to the EU Charter Art. 11.  
The ECJ referred to the EU Charter Art. 52(3) and stated that Art. 11 had the same meaning 
and scope as Art. 10 ECHR. In relation to this, it was clear that Art. 11 covered the use by a 
business of labelling and advertising, which was the core of the case. It was then reiterated 
that the right in Art. 16 must be seen in the light of its ‘social function’.111 The ECJ has in 
case-law stated that such rights which have a social function are not to be considered as 
absolute. See Case C-544/10 Weintor, where the Court states that ‘it must be borne in mind 
that […] the freedom to pursue a trade or profession, like the right to property, is not an 
absolute right but must be considered in relation to its social function”.112  
The approach of the ECJ in this case shows that the obligation under Art. 52(3) may have an 
influence also on those Articles of the Charter that do not correspond to the ECHR. This is 
because the ECHR right in many cases may encompass the rights enshrined in the non-
corresponding provisions of the EU Charter.  
                                                
108  Melloni  (n  108),  paras.  55-­64.  
109  See  Art.  6(3)  TEU  and  the  EU  Charter  Art.  52(3).  
110  Case  C-­157/14  Neptune  v.  Ministre  de  l’Économe  et  des  Finances  [2015]  EU:C:2015:823.  
111  ibid  para  66.  
112  See  Case  C-­544/10  Deutsches  Weintor  eG  v  Land  Rheinland-­Pfalz  [2012]  EU:C:2012:526  para.  54  
cf.  Case  C-­210/03  The  Queen  v  Secretary  of  State  for  Health  [2004]  ECR  I-­11893,  para  72.  
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Further, the fact that the ECJ uses the characterisation of ‘social’ to indicate that it is a 
principle and thus derogable, shows that the social rights enshrined in the Charter may be 
intended to be merely principles, and thus have a lower level of protection according to Art. 
52(5).  
The ECJ does not rely on the ECHR in all cases regarding fundamental rights. An example of 
this is Case C-395/15 Daouidi113 regarding prohibition of discrimination based on disability. 
This freedom is not enshrined in the ECHR, and there were other international human rights 
sources covering the right. Thus, the ECJ did not find it necessary to refer to the ECHR when 
making its decision, or indeed during the interpretation of the provision.  
2.5.3   The  EFTA  Court  
Within the EEA, there have been some decisions regarding human rights. The EU Charter is 
as mentioned not legally binding on the EEA EFTA States. However, since the Charter has an 
impact on EU law, it is natural that EEA law will also be influenced by it. The EFTA Court 
has confirmed that the obligation to comply with fundamental rights ‘manifestly comes within 
the scope of EEA law’.114 Furthermore, all EEA Member States are also Parties to the ECHR, 
making it reasonable for the EFTA Court to base EEA human rights on the ECHR. This is 
also in many cases what the EFTA Court has done.115 
The EFTA Court has also affirmed that the Agreement must be interpreted in accordance with 
the case law from the ECJ regardless of when it was handed down.116 This does not mean that 
the EFTA Court is bound by interpretations of the ECJ, it merely notes its importance in 
relation to the principle of homogeneity, which would be best upheld if EEA fundamental 
rights were equal to EU fundamental rights.117  
                                                
113  Case  C-­395/15  Mohamed  Daouidi  [2016]  EU:C:2016:917.  
114  Joint  Cases  E-­3/13  and  E-­20/13  Olsen  and  Others  [2014]  EFTA  Ct.  Rep  400,  para.  227.  
115  See  e.g.  Case  E-­8/97  TV  1000  Sverige  AB  v  the  Norwegian  Government  represented  by  the  Royal  
Ministry  of  Cultural  Affairs  [1997]  EFTA  Ct.  Rep.  68,  para.  26  especially.  
116  Case  E-­2/94  Scottish  Salmon  Growers  Association  Ltd  V  EFTA  Surveillance  Authority  [1995]  EFTA  
Ct.  Rep.  59,  paras.  10-­13.  
117  See  the  EFTA  Courts’  statement  in  Case  E-­18/11  Irish  Bank  Resolution  Corporation  V  Kaupping  
[2012]  EFTA  Ct.  Rep.  592,  para.  122:  ‘[T]he  objective  of  establishing  a  dynamic  and  homogeneous  
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Further, it has stated, in the Ásgeirsson case that the EEA shall be interpreted in light of 
fundamental rights, and that the ECHR and ECJ case law “are important sources for 
determining the scope of these rights”.118 An interesting point is that the EFTA Court in this 
case still chose to refer to the ECHR and the ECtHR rather than the EU Charter and ECJ case 
law, even though the Charter was binding at this point.  
The cases mentioned so far were all except Ásgeirsson raised before EFTA Court before the 
EU Charter came into existence. This shows that there was room for human rights 
considerations within the EEA even before they were codified within a separate framework in 
the EU. This seen together with the principle of homogeneity speaks in favour of the EU 
Charter having influence on the relevant fundamental rights within the EEA.  
Indeed, after the EU Charter came into being, it has been mentioned in the decisions of the 
EFTA Court on several occasions. An early mention was in Case E-2/02 Bellona,119 where 
one of the applicants referred to the EU Charter. In this case, the Court did not make further 
mention of the Charter.  
In the recent Case E-4/11 Clauder, the EFTA Court itself referred to the EU Charter, stating 
that ‘The Court notes that in the European Union the same right is protected by Article 7 of 
the Charter’.120 However, it does not base its judgment upon the provision of the EU Charter. 
For EU Charter rights that have a corresponding provision in the ECHR, there should not be a 
lot of controversy, considering that all the EEA EFTA States in any case are bound by the 
ECHR. In the Case E-10/14 Deveci,121 the EFTA Court handled a situation regarding EU 
legislation that included a reference to a provision of the EU Charter which does not have a 
corresponding provision in the ECHR, namely the EU Charter Art. 16 (freedom to conduct a 
business). The Norwegian government expressed concern about accepting such rights not 
included in the ECHR (or in other human rights frameworks to which the EEA EFTA States 
                                                
European  Economic  Area  can  only  be  achieved  if  EFTA  and  EU  citizens  and  economic  operators  
enjoy,  relying  upon  EEA  law,  the  same  rights  in  both  the  EU  and  EFTA  pillars  of  the  EEA.’  
118  Case  E-­2/03  Ásgeirsson  and  Others  [2003]  EFTA  Ct.  Rep  185,  para  23.  
119  Case  E-­2/02  Bellona  v  ESA  [2003]  EFTA  Ct.  Rep  53,  para.  28.  
120  Case  E-­4/11  Clauder  [2012]  EFTA  Ct.  Rep.  216.  
121  Case  E-­10/14  Enes  Deveci  and  Others  v  Scandinavian  Airlines  [2014]  EFTA  Ct.  Rep.  1364.  
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are Parties).122 The reason behind the concern was that this would challenge State sovereignty 
and the principle of consent. The EFTA Court did not address the question of Art. 16 in this 
case and simply stated that the freedom to conduct a business was inherent in the EEA 
Agreement itself.123  
Consequently, it is not entirely clear how and whether the fundamental rights of the EU 
Charter that not correspond to the ECHR may be implemented in the EEA. Homogeneity may 
be at risk if the interpretation on these rights diverge in the EEA.  
2.6   The  Vienna  Convention124  
The Vienna Convention (“VCLT") Art. 1 states that the VCLT applies to ‘treaties between 
States’. Consequently, it will not apply to treaties with other subjects of international law, 
such as the EU. However, it does apply to the ECHR, and its contents is regarded as general 
principles of international law. It is therefore applicable when interpreting international 
treaties, when there are no other rules specifically regulating the same area of law. In this 
case, the principles may consequently be of relevance insofar as certain elements are not 
regulated by the ECHR, the EU Charter or other provisions. 
Article 30 governs the situation where a new treaty regulates the same subject-matter as an 
already existing treaty. Paragraph 2 states that when a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or 
that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, another earlier or later treaty, the 
provisions of that treaty prevails.  
Article 30 paragraph 4 states that when the parties to the later treaty do not include all the 
parties to the earlier one then; a) between States Parties to both treaties the same rule applies 
as in paragraph 3,125 or b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only 
one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and 
                                                
122  Ibid,  paras.  40,  44  and  46.  
123  Bellona  (n  120),  para.  64.  
124  Vienna  Convention  (n  59).  
125  When  all  the  parties  to  the  earlier  treaty  are  parties  also  to  the  later  treaty  but  the  earlier  treaty  is  
not  terminated  or  suspended  in  operation  under  Article  59,  the  earlier  treaty  applies  only  to  the  extent  
that  its  provisions  are  compatible  with  those  of  the  latter  treaty.    
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obligations. In this case, where all the parties to the EU Charter are also parties to the ECHR, 
letter a applies.  
3   Comparison  of  the  Charter  and  the  ECHR  
3.1   Introduction  
This chapter includes a comparison of some of the Articles of the EU Charter and the ECHR, 
focusing on how the level of protection may be different in each human rights framework. A 
beneficial way of illustrating this is to categorize the EU Charter Articles according to the 
level of inspiration drawn from the ECHR, as this will enlighten the differences in level of 
protection for the EU Charter rights with the same “meaning and scope”126 as an ECHR 
provision, and those inspired by other sources.  
The categorisation of rights applied under the “The Rights” subchapter of this thesis is 
inspired by the EU Charter Art. 52 and the Explanations’127 statements thereto. It thus 
includes the following categories: Charter Articles of which the meaning and the scope 
correspond to provisions of the ECHR; Charter Articles of which the meaning corresponds, 
but not the scope, Charter Articles inspired by case law of the ECtHR;128 Charter Articles 
inspired by EU primary law;129 Charter Articles inspired by ECJ case law and Member States’ 
Constitutions;130 and Charter Articles inspired by other human rights sources.  
In the following, the Explanations is frequently referenced. Though not legally binding,131 it 
is described in the preamble as ‘[A] valuable tool of interpretation intended to clarify the 
provisions of the Charter’.132 According to the EU Charter art. 52(7), the ‘[E]xplanations […] 
shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States’. A similar 
                                                
126  The  EU  Charter  Art.  52(1).  
127  Explanations  (n  74).  
128  EU  Charter  (n  1)  Art.  52(3)  cf.  the  Explanations  (n  74)  17.  
129  EU  Charter  (n  1)  Art.  52(2)  cf.  the  Explanations  (n  74)  17.  
130  EU  Charter  (n  1)  Art.  52(4)  cf.  the  Explanations  (n  74)  17.  
131  Explanations  (n  74)  preamble.  
132  Explanations  (n  74)  1,  first  paragraph.  
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wording has been included in Art. 6(3) TEU. The fact that reference to this document is 
incorporated both in the TEU and in the Charter, confirms its importance.133 
The Explanations give guidance about the connection each article has to the ECHR, making it 
valuable to take into consideration when looking at the relationship of these two frameworks.  
3.2   General  observations  
Before comparing the Articles of the EU Charter and the ECHR, it is necessary to consider 
other, more general factors regarding the systems of the EU and the Council of Europe, which 
may have an impact on the level of protection provided by each provision.  
3.2.1   Scope  
Firstly, the ECHR has more ratifications than the EU Charter, as all 47 Member States of the 
Council of Europe are bound by the ECHR134 (with some exceptions regarding certain 
Protocols,),135 whilst the 28 EU Member States are bound by both the Charter and the 
ECHR.136 Since this thesis focuses on the situation within the EU, this difference in scope is 
not relevant to the level of protection of human rights, as both frameworks may be applied 
within all EU Member States.  
According to the EU Charter Art. 51(1), the provisions of the Charter are addressed to ‘the 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (…) and to the Member States only 
when implementing Union law’. This means that the EU institutions etc. are bound by the 
Charter in all their activities, and the Member States only so when acting within the scope of 
EU law.  
                                                
133  The  ECJ  has  used  the  Explanations  to  interpret  provisions  of  the  EU  Charter,  see  e.g.  Fransson  (n  
78).  
134  Simplified  Chart  of  signatories  and  ratifications  http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-­on-­
treaties/-­/conventions/chartSignature/3  accessed  March  15  2017.    
135  See  Council  of  Europe,  ’Our  Member  States’,  (n  7):  Among  the  EU  Member  States,  Greece,  Turkey  
and  the  United  Kingdom  are  not  bound  by  Protocol  4  ECHR,  whilst  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  the  
United  Kingdom  have  not  ratified  Protocol  7.  Protocols  9,  10,  12,  14,  15  and  16  have  also  not  yet  been  
ratified  by  several  of  the  Member  States.  
136  See  Art.  6(1)  TEU.  
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What falls within the scope of EU law, is defined in “TITLE I” of TFEU cf. Art. 1 TFEU, but 
the boundaries are in practice not entirely clear. It might also seem as though the threshold for 
falling under EU law is lower when the case concerns human rights.137 
The fact that the Charter only applies in cases regarding EU law puts a limitation on the reach 
of the Charter rights.138 A corresponding limitation is not applicable to the ECHR rights, as 
those rights shall be guaranteed for everyone within the High Contracting Parties’ jurisdiction 
regardless of area of law.139 Consequently, outside the realm of Union law, individuals in EU 
Member States must rely on ECHR (or other human rights sources) rather than the EU 
Charter to guarantee their human rights. However, as mentioned above, it appears the ECJ is 
willing to stretch the limits of EU law as far as it can in the cases regarding human rights. A 
reason for this might be the understanding of fundamental rights as universal and 
transcending of different areas of law, as well as their importance in a developed society.  
For the European Union, the EU Charter applies to its institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies. It should be noted that the Explanations on Art. 51(1) states that the EU 
constellations are the prime addressees of the Charter.140 This fact differentiates the EU 
Charter protection of human rights from that of the ECHR as the guarantee for protection in 
the EU also applies at a European level. In fact, the European Union is the ‘only 
international/supranational organisation providing for fundamental rights protection against 
its own conduct’.141  
To be able to provide protection for fundamental rights against itself as a supranational 
organisation is surely a positive thing. However, the European Union and its organs are not 
                                                
137  Case  C-­600/00  Mary  Carpenter  v  Home  Secretary  [2004]  ECR  I-­6279.  The  case  concerned  the  
interpretation  of  EC  law  on  free  movement  and  residence  within  the  Community  for  nationals  of  
Member  States  regarding  establishment  and  the  provision  of  services.  In  this  case,  the  ECJ  found  that  
it  was  sufficient  that  the  applicant’s  husband  was  working  with  procurement  of  advertising  in  several  
other  Member  States,  for  EU  law  on  human  rights  to  be  applicable,  even  though  the  applicant  herself  
was  not  a  national  of  a  Member  State.    
138  See  e.g.  Art.  51(2)  which  states  that  the  Charter  does  not  affect  the  field  of  application  of  EU  law  of  
the  powers  and  tasks  of  the  Union  .  
139European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  (1953)  Art.  1.  
140  Explanations  (n  74)  16,  first  paragraph.  
141  Blanke  &  Mangiameli  (eds)  (n  65)  289.  
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purely human rights oriented, which begs the question of whether fundamental rights may 
suffer due to other interests that the deciding organs of the EU find more important in a 
certain case. In this perspective, it can be argued that ECtHR has more legitimacy structurally 
speaking, in that its sole objective is to ‘ensure the observance of the engagements taken by 
the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto’.142  
Another difference between the scope of the EU Charter and the ECHR is that the Charter 
guarantees protection for a larger number of rights, and includes rights which are not 
protected by the ECHR, such as the right to engage in work, rights of the elderly, right of 
access to a free placement service and the right to health care.143 These rights are of a social 
nature and thus falls outside the core of the ECHR, which guarantees mostly civil and 
political rights.  
A consequence of this difference in range of rights is that within the scope of EU law, the 
social rights have been elevated in influence and importance. This also means that the 
Member States have an increased obligation to respect human rights of a social nature within 
the scope of EU law. A possibility to be considered is that there might be a flow of influence 
from the EU to the rest of Europe, to elevate social human rights. Regarding the ECHR and 
the Council of Europe, a possibility is to include more social rights into the Convention 
through Protocols or possibly via an amendment of the ECHR. Another possibility is to 
attempt to get the European Social Charter’s144 influence on par with the ECHR, as this 
Charter is a ‘Council of Europe treaty that guarantees fundamental social and economic rights 
as a counterpart to the European Convention on Human Rights’.145  
                                                
142  Art.  19  ECHR.  
143  TC  Hartley,  The  Foundations  of  European  Union  Law  (OUP  2014)  156.  
144  European  Social  Charter  (1996)  ETS  163.  
145  Council  of  Europe,  ’The  European  Social  Charter’  https://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-­european-­
social-­charter  accessed  16  March  2017.  See  also  Additional  Protocol  to  the  European  Social  Charter  
Providing  for  a  System  of  Collective  Complaints  (Council  of  Europe  1995).  The  European  Social  
Charter  has  only  34  ratifications  from  the  Member  States  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  most  of  which  have  
attached  some  form  of  reservation.  The  system  of  monitoring  the  Social  Charter  is  also  different  from  
the  ECHR.  For  instance,  instead  of  a  court  making  decisions  on  the  provisions  of  the  European  Social  
Charter,  there  is  the  European  Committee  of  Social  Rights,  which  has  the  task  of  monitoring  that  the  
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The interpretation of the EU Charter rights is limited by Art. 53, which states that nothing in 
the Charter can restrict or affect human rights as recognised by EU law, national agreements 
to which the EU or all Member States are party or by national constitutions of the Member 
States. In relation to the ECHR, this means that the EU Charter rights may not be applied in a 
way that makes more extensive limitations in rights guaranteed by the ECHR than is 
permitted for within the ECHR.  
Here there is also reason to point out the fact that the ECHR’s scope covers all the EEA 
States, while the EU Charter does not officially apply to the EEA EFTA States. Neither 
instrument is binding upon the EFTA organs. However, as mentioned above, fundamental 
rights are important to the EEA, thus it could be argued that it is necessary with fundamental 
rights protection also binding on the EEA organs. In relation to the EU, the principle of 
homogeneity speaks in favour of interpretation in accordance with EU law. One way to 
guarantee homogeneity is to include the EU law on human rights, including the Charter, for 
cases where the ECJ has not yet decided. However, this appears to be unrealistic in the near 
future, due to the sizable amendment to the EEA this would constitute.  
3.2.2   Absolute  vs.  conditional  rights 
There is a distinction both within the ECHR and the EU Charter between absolute rights, 
which in principle may not be derogated from, and conditional rights, which under certain 
conditions may be subject to derogation.  
An example of a non-derogable right within the ECHR is Art. 3: the right not to be subject to 
torture or inhuman treatment. The corresponding rights within the EU Charter will also be 
non-derogable, as well as the rest of the provisions within the EU Charter Title I.146 
Since the EU Charter contains a wider variety of rights than the ECHR, absolute rights that 
are only included in the EU Charter could pose limitations on derogable rights guaranteed in 
both frameworks. This could cause a clash between the scope and/or meaning of rights that 
                                                
states  are  upholding  the  Social  Charter  and  its  Protocols,  and  of  making  decisions  that  must  be  
respected  by  the  States  concerned.  
146  Koen  Lenaerts,  ’Exploring  the  Limits  of  the  EU  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights’  (2012)  8  ECLR  375,  
388.  
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are guaranteed by both frameworks.  
An example is the EU Charter Art. 1 cf. the Explanations’147 comments on human dignity, 
which state that human dignity may not be violated, even where this would be restricting 
another right. This basically means that any right leading to a violation of human dignity is in 
breach of the EU Charter. It should be noted here that in the case of such a discordance 
between the two frameworks, the EU Charter Art. 53 would oblige the applicants of the 
Charter to not interpret ECHR-based Charter provisions restrictively, since ‘[n]othing in this 
Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights’ as recognised 
in inter alia the ECHR. 
Another point is the distinction within the EU Charter between rights and principles. The EU 
Charter Art. 51(1) states that while rights shall be respected, principles shall be observed. This 
shows a distinction in legal force between principles and rights. 
The EU Charter Art. 52(5) continues by stating that principles ‘shall be judicially cognisable 
only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality’. This means that 
principles ‘become significant to Courts only when such acts are interpreted or reviewed. 
They do not however give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union’s institutions 
or Member State authorities’.148 This provision narrows the scope of which provisions of the 
EU Charter may give direct rise to claims. Lenaerts points out that this provision was 
included to satisfy those EU Member States who had problems accepting the including of 
social and economic rights into the Charter,149 and thus this provision is aimed at rights 
enshrined in Title IV of the Charter. However, there is no clarification within the Charter of 
which exact provisions shall be principles; only the Explanations give a few examples.150 
This means that EU Charter principles have a lower level of protection than the rights. This 
distinction may have an impact on the level of protection that an EU Charter right has 
compared to an ECHR right. However, since this provision is aimed at social and economic 
rights, which are generally not enshrined in the ECHR, the difference made by this provision 
                                                
147  Explanations  (n  74)  1.  
148  Explanations  (n  74)  19.  
149  Lenaerts  (n  147)  8  ECLR  375,  399  et  sec.  
150  Explanations  (n  74)  35.  
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is limited.  
3.2.3   Locus  Standi  
Within the EU, locus standi is largely regulated in Art. 263 TFEU, regarding the ECJ’s 
obligation to review the legality of binding EU acts intended to produce legal effects vis-á-vis 
third parties. According to Paragraph 2, Member States, as well as the European Parliament, 
Council and Commission shall always have standing before the ECJ. Paragraph 3 gives 
limited standing to some of the lower organs of the EU, whilst paragraph 4 concerns 
individual applicants.  
Article 263(4) TFEU states that ‘any natural or legal person may … institute proceedings 
against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, 
and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail 
implementing measures’.151 Thus, there is no individual complaint procedure before the ECJ 
regarding breaches of EU legislation (such as the EU Charter) made by a Member State.  
In order for an individual to obtain this, he or she must make use of the preliminary rulings 
procedure in Art. 267 TFEU, hoping that the domestic court decides to refer the question to 
the ECJ. According to Art. 267(2), a domestic court of last instance is obliged to make a 
preliminary application whilst the lower ones may choose to do so according to national 
legislation. 
In the ECHR Art. 33 and 34 regulate locus standi. Article 33 states that any Contracting Party 
have standing before the ECtHR regarding alleged breach of the provisions therein and in the 
Protocols thereto. Regarding individual applications, Art. 34 states that such may be received 
by the ECtHR if the claimant(s) is ‘victim’ of a violation by a Contracting Party of the ECHR 
or its Protocols.  
The lack of an individual complaint procedure on the EU Charter means that it is more 
difficult for individuals to ascertain their rights according to the Charter, than it is under the 
ECHR. However, there are other factors that come into play. For instance, for individual 
applications under the ECHR, the principle of subsidiarity and Art. 35(1) ECHR requires that 
                                                
151  This  provision  shall  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  Case  C-­222/83  Municipality  of  Differdange  v  
Commission  [1984]  ECR  I-­2889,  para.  9.  
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an individual must exhaust all national remedies before going to the ECtHR. Unfortunately, 
the ECtHR has a massive backlog of cases, meaning means that it is a lengthy process to have 
your rights determined by the ECtHR.  
Finally, the fact that the ECHR contains additional admissibility criteria in Art. 35(2) and (3), 
should be noted, as there are no such criteria in the EU Charter. Article 35(2) obliges the 
ECtHR to dismiss individual applications which are anonymous or have already been 
examined substantially by the Court or submitted to another procedure of international 
examination and thus contains no new information. Article 35(3) ECHR states that the 
ECtHR must dismiss any application which is manifestly ill-founded or an abuse of the right 
to individual application.  
An admissibility criterion allowing the ECJ to dismiss a case if it is ‘manifestly inadmissible’ 
may be found in the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ Art. 53(2). 
3.2.4   Contextual  difference  
The contextual difference between the EU Charter and the ECHR is partly that rights 
guaranteed in the latter framework are protected by a court which is a specialized human 
rights court, dedicated to questions regarding the interpretation and application of the 
framework, whilst the first framework is protected by a court which also makes decisions on a 
wide range of other areas of law.  
This might lead to questions about the competence of the ECJ to act as a human rights court. 
In addition to this, in a case before the ECJ, the human rights question will often only be a 
part of the conflict that needs resolving, and a decision on whether the fundamental right has 
been violated does not necessarily dictate the outcome of the case. In cases before the ECtHR, 
the human rights issue will be the only issue on which the Court may decide.152 The fact is 
that the ECtHR is a narrower and therefore more focused court.  
Another part of the contextual difference is the aims of the institutions that created these 
human rights frameworks. In the preamble of the ECHR recital 4 it is stated that the Council 
of Europe aims to achieve ‘greater unity between its members’, by the ‘maintenance and 
further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. Reference is also made to 
                                                
152  Arts.  32  and  19  ECHR.  
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the value of the ‘effective political democracy’. The preamble reads that the sole objective of 
the ECHR is the guaranteeing of human rights and fundamental freedoms to create unity in 
European States.  
Further, the Articles of the ECHR include derogations from the non-absolute rights under 
conditions which take into consideration such measures that are necessary in a democratic 
society and with respect to the rule of law,153 or in a time of emergency.154 
In comparison, the preambles of the EU Charter refer to a larger number of considerations, 
such as the four freedoms155 and the powers and tasks of the Union.156 The EU Charter has 
one generally applicable derogation provision in Art. 52(1) which allows derogation 
according to the rule of law and with respect for the essence of the rights and freedoms within 
the EU Charter. Further, limitation may only be made if necessary and if they meet the 
objectives generally recognised by the Union.  
It becomes apparent that the EU Charter does not have the entirely same objectives as the 
ECHR. The fact that Art. 52(1) of the EU Charter mentions objectives recognised by the 
Union can be interpreted in light of the preamble, which refers to the four freedoms. A 
possible interpretation of this is that economic considerations relating to the four freedoms 
may in some situations have primacy over human rights within the EU.157 Burchill uses the 
ECJ’s statements in the Cases C-438/05 Viking158 and C-341/05 Laval159 as examples of cases 
where the ECJ has put economic considerations relating to the four freedoms above human 
rights.160 It should be noted that these decisions were handed down after the EU Charter was 
proclaimed, but before it became legally binding, and perhaps the fundamental rights therein 
would have stronger impact post-Lisbon. However, as mentioned above, the preamble and 
                                                
153  See  Arts.  2,  5,  8,  9,  10  and  11  ECHR.  
154  Art.  15  ECHR.    
155  EU  Charter  preamble  recital  3.  
156  Ibid,  recital  5.  
157  See  Richard  Burchill  ’Assessing  the  EU’s  position  on  human  rights:  Is  it  a  desirable  one?’  in  J.  
Wetzel  (ed)  The  EU  as  a  Global  Player  in  the  Field  of  Human  Rights  (Routledge  2011)  .  
158  Case  C-­438/05,  International  Transport  Workers’  Federation  and  Finnish  Seamen’s  Union  v  Viking  
Line  [2007]  ECR  10779.  
159  Case  C-­341/05,  Laval  v  Svenska  Byggnadsarbetareförbundet  [2007]  ECR  11767.  
160    Burchill  (n  158)  24.  
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Art. 52(1) still allow limitations on those rights to meet objectives recognised by the EU, 
hereunder presumably the four freedoms. 
Burchill makes the point that at the core of the EU is the internal market, which is based on 
market considerations, and the EU has grown from there. Basically, it did not come from a 
human rights starting point, like the ECHR did. This should influence how the fundamental 
rights of the EU Charter will be interpreted, and from a human rights point of view it is an 
argument for the need of external control of the EU in the area of human rights.  
Here the contextual difference of the EEA is relevant toward its relationship with the EU. The 
EEA does not operate with supremacy of EEA law, and there is thus not the same danger of 
constitutions being overridden to the detriment of human rights. Also, historically, the EEA is 
a way for the EFTA States to be included in the internal market without being bound by all 
the other structural and material rules of the EU. These are arguments against applying the EU 
Charter within the EEA.  
On the other hand, the human rights protection of the EEA will, like the EU Charter, be 
interpreted in light of the purpose of the Agreement. The EEA is mainly concerned about the 
internal market, in an even higher degree than the EU, meaning that there is a risk of human 
rights being adversely affected for the benefit of economic interests.161  
3.2.5   Derogation  
There are a few different ways that an ECHR Contracting Party or an EU Member State may 
make exceptions from the non-absolute rights and freedoms in the ECHR and the EU Charter. 
Some provisions contain express permission for limitations under certain conditions. These 
shall be considered first. There are also separate derogation provisions in both frameworks, 
which will be looked at second. Finally, there will be a consideration of the rules on 
reservations and the provisions on prohibition of abuse of rights.  
                                                
161  See  e.g.  Case  E-­2/11  STX  and  Others  [2012]  EFTA  Ct.  Rep.  4  and  Case  E-­14/15  Holship  [2016],  
not  yet  reported.  
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Within the ECHR there are several Articles including express permission to make limitations 
to the right guaranteed by that Article in the protection of “legitimate interests”.162 These are 
Arts. 8, 9, 10, 11 and Protocol No 4 Art. 2. Protocol 1 Art. 1 to the ECHR on the peaceful 
enjoyment of property should also be mentioned, as it includes a limited amount of interests 
that may be legitimate to warrant limitation on the right to peaceful enjoyment of property.  
The actions which may be legitimised by these interests must in all cases be “necessary in a 
democratic society”, and must be prescribed by law. It is for the ECtHR to decide whether 
these criteria are fulfilled.163  
Within the EU Charter, no such limitations are incorporated into the text of any of the 
Articles. However, all the above-mentioned ECHR Articles except Protocol 4 Art. 2, have a 
corresponding provision within the EU Charter based on the ECHR provision. In accordance 
with the EU Charter Art. 52(3) and the Explanations on the relevant Charter Articles, the 
meaning and scope of those Charter Articles shall be the same as those of the ECHR. 
Consequently, there may not be any more extensive limitations to the corresponding rights of 
the EU Charter than allowed under the ECHR. The Explanations mention that the EU Charter 
Art. 12, which corresponds to the Art. 11 ECHR, has a wider scope, since it also applies on 
EU level.164  
Thus, in the case of the rights protected in Art. 8 to 11 ECHR and Protocol 1 Art. 1 to the 
ECHR, the same rules for limitation applies for the corresponding provisions within the EU 
Charter, with exceptions allowing for more extensive protection within the EU.  
Within the ECHR, Art. 15 is a derogation clause allowing Contracting States to derogate from 
their obligations under the ECHR in time of emergency.165 This Article does not have a 
corresponding provision within the EU Charter. It allows Contracting Parties to derogate in 
                                                
162  For  in-­debt  analysis  of  the  legitimate  interests  and  the  requirements  of  rule  of  law  and  of  necessity,  
see  Stephen  Greer,  Human  rights  files  no  15,  The  Exceptions  to  Articles  8  to  11  of  the  European  
Convention  on  Human  Rights  (Council  of  Europe  Publishing  1997).  
163  See  Case  of  The  Sunday  Times  v  The  United  Kingdom  App  no  6538/74  (ECtHR  26  April  1979)  
para.  59  et  sec.  
164  Explanations  (n  74)  6.  
165  For  more  about  ECHR  Art.  15,  see  Council  of  Europe  ’Guide  on  Article  15  of  the  European  
Convention  on  Human  Rights’  (CoE  2016)  available  at  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_15_ENG.pdf  accessed  11  April  2017.  
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‘time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ to the extent ‘strictly 
required’, provided that such measures are ‘not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
national law’.  
The Article allows for derogation from all the substantive rights in the ECHR, except for 
those mentioned in Art. 15(2). The non-derogable rights are Art. 2 on the right to life, Art. 3 
on the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, Art. 4 on slavery and Art. 7 on the rule of 
law. No derogation may be made from the Articles of Protocol No 6 or from Article 4 or 
Protocol No 7 to the ECHR, which concern death penalty and the right not to be tried or 
punished twice, respectively. 
It should be noted that this derogation clause only allows for derogation to the extent strictly 
required, which means that it is ideally only allowing necessary derogation for a limited 
amount of time. However, case law has shown that the time period can last for several years, 
and the ECtHR has never explicitly stated that the emergency must be temporary for the 
clause to apply.166  
Within the EU Charter the derogation clause is Art. 52(1). Although it does not state 
explicitly that any of the EU Charter Articles may be non-derogable, the wording of the 
provision opens up for it. Additionally, the ECJ has accepted the existence of non-derogable 
rights within the EU Charter.167 It is not thus said that those non-derogable rights are the same 
as in the ECHR, meaning that Art. 52(1) could have a different scope than Art. 15 ECHR.  
This provision has a different approach than the ECHR derogation clause since there is no 
requirement of any extraordinary crisis or war for it to be applicable. Instead there is a 
requirement that any limitation must be provided for by law and respect the essence of the 
rights and freedoms included in the Charter.  
Further, the limitations must be ‘necessary and genuinely meet the objectives of general 
interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’. 
This includes such interests that are especially relevant for the EU, such as interests regarding 
                                                
166  Council  of  Europe  ’Guide  on  Article  15  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights’  (CoE  2016)  
available  at  http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_15_ENG.pdf  on  page  6  para  9,  accessed  
11  April  2017.  
167  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner  &  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  1469-­1470.  
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the four freedoms and the internal market. There is also no mention of the “democratic 
society” which is so central in the ECHR. However, since there is mention of democracy 
several other places within the EU Treaties and the EU Charter, this might not have been 
considered necessary.  
In its wording, Art. 52(1) is more similar to the inherent limitation clauses of Art. 8 to 11 
ECHR than to Art. 15 ECHR. According to the Explanations, the provision is based on case 
law of the ECJ, which indicates that the interpretation of the criteria of the provision is 
autonomous within the EU. However, the wording ‘according to law’ is echoing the ECHR, 
and thus it is arguable that the same requirements for the quality of the ‘law’ which apply in 
the ECHR, should also apply for the EU Charter. According to Peers, Steve and Sacha 
Prechal, the ECJ has not yet confirmed whether this is the case.168  
Regarding the reference to objectives of general interest recognised by the Union, the 
Explanations refer to Arts. 3 and 4(1) TEU as well as Arts. 35(3), 36 and 346 TFEU, for 
clarification of the contents of those interests. The listed Articles mention several interests, 
both private and public such as economic interests relating to the internal market, social 
rights, rights relating to freedom and security, public morality etc.  
Regarding the reference to Art. 35(3) TFEU, there seems to be a mistake within the 
Explanations since the provision does not exist.169  
Article 54 of the EU Charter on the prohibition on abuse of rights corresponds to Art. 17 
ECHR.170 However, there are some differences which may be of importance when 
interpreting these provisions. For instance, the EU Charter Art. 52(1) states that ‘any 
limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must (…) 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’. This poses an additional limitation on the 
application of Art. 54. 
Another difference lies in the fact that the EU Charter operates with rights, freedoms and 
principles,171 whilst neither the Charter Art. 54 nor Art. 17 ECHR mention principles. 
                                                
168  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner  &  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  1473.  
169  See  also  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner  &  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  1475,  Section  52.48.  
170  Explanations  (n  74)  19.  
171  See  the  EU  Charter  Art.  52(5).  
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Furthermore, the ECHR does not even operate with principles as such. Woods theorises that 
the reason for leaving out principles in Art. 54 is that they cannot in themselves form a basis 
for an attack on the Charter or its essence.172  
3.3   The  rights  
Not all the Charter rights have relevance outside the EU context. In relation to the EEA, Nils 
Wahl points to some provisions guaranteeing rights for the EU citizens,173 namely the EU 
Charter Art. 39, 40, 42, 43, 44 and 46. Such provisions will not have any relevance toward the 
ECHR either. Consequently, this comparison will not include those rights.  
Below is a selection from the remaining pool of rights, chosen because of their general 
importance in the EU or because of their ability to illustrate the different levels of protection 
that may be guaranteed under the EU Charter and the ECHR.  
3.3.1   Charter  Articles  of  which  the  meaning  corresponds  to  provisions  in  
the  ECHR,  but  not  the  scope  
3.3.1.1   The  right  to  effective  remedy  
This right to effective remedy is protected by art. 13 ECHR and by the EU Charter Art. 47(1). 
According to the annual report by the European Commission,174 the EU Charter Art. 47 is the 
provision which was referred to the most times by the ECJ in 2015. 
Article 13 ECHR states that if someone has their rights or freedoms under the ECHR violated, 
they shall have an ‘effective remedy before a national authority’. 
The EU Charter Article 47(1) states that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
Union law are violated, shall have ‘effective remedy’ before a ‘tribunal’.  
                                                
172  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner,  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  1550,  section  54.36.  
173  Nils  Wahl,  ’Unchartered  Waters:  Reflections  on  the  Legal  Significance  of  the  Charter  under  EEA  
Law  and  Judicial  Cross-­Fertilisation  in  the  Field  of  Fundamental  Rights’  in  the  EFTA  Court  (ed),  The  
EEA  and  the  EFTA  Court:  Decentred  Integration:  to  Mark  the  20th  Anniversary  of  the  EFTA  Court  
(Hart  Publishing  2014)  295.  
174  European  Commission,  ‘2015  report  on  the  application  of  the  EU  Charter  of  fundamental  rights’  
(Luxembourg  2016  Publications  Office  of  the  European  Union)  27.  
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In accordance with the EU Charter Art. 52(3) cf. Art. 6(2) TEU, the scope and meaning of the 
right to effective remedy in the EU Charter Art. 47(1) shall be the same as in Art. 13 ECHR, 
if it is the same right guaranteed in both provisions. The Explanations on Article 47(1) do not 
explicitly state that the scope and meaning shall be interpreted the same. Rather, it merely 
states that the EU Charter Art. 47(1) is ‘based on Article 13 of the ECHR’,175 and that the 
protection under Art. 47(1) is more extensive.  
The fact that the remedy according to the ECHR is to be decided by a ‘national authority’, is 
a manifestation of the principle of subsidiarity in the ECHR system and means that it depends 
on each Contracting Party’s legal system what is a ‘national authority’. The EU Charter, 
however, uses the wording ‘tribunal’, which in accordance with a natural understanding and 
the EU Explanations176 means that the party that demands remedy, has the right to have his 
claim assessed and decided upon by a court.  
Having the contents of your rights decided before a court will naturally provide more 
protection for the rule of law, as there will be guaranteed procedural rules laid down to ensure 
a fair trial. That may not be the case if for instance any regular administrative authority could 
make the decision. The Member States also have an obligation to ‘provide remedies sufficient 
to ensure effective legal protection within the scope of EU law’,177 which means that if 
sufficient procedure is not laid down within the legal system of the Contracting Party, there 
will be a breach of the Charter provision.  
Thus, the procedural safeguards under the EU Charter are somewhat more extensive than 
under the ECHR.  
3.3.1.2   The  right  to  a  fair  trial  
This right is protected within the ECHR by Art. 6(1). It is the provision of the ECHR that the 
ECtHR found to be breached by the Contracting Parties the most frequently in 2016.178 
                                                
175  Explanations  (n  74)  13.  
176  Explanations  (n  74)  13,  final  paragraph.  
177  TEU  (n  18)  Art.  19(1)  paragraph  2.  
178  Council  of  Europe,  ‘Annual  Report  2016  on  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights’  (2017)  p.  191.  
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In the EU Charter, the right to a fair trial is governed by Article 47(2) and according to the 
annual report by the European Commission,179 the EU Charter Art. 47 is the provision which 
has been referenced the most by the ECJ in 2015.  
When addressing the EU Charter Article 47(2), and its relationship to Art. 6(1) ECHR, the 
Explanations state that ‘in all respects other than their scope, the guarantees afforded by the 
ECHR apply in a similar way to the Union’.180 When seen in context with the EU Charter Art. 
51(3), the statement in the EU Explanations may be interpreted as meaning that the EU 
Charter Art. 47(2) guarantees the same right as Art. 6(1) in the ECHR.  
Since the meaning of these provisions are consequently presumed to be the same, it is the 
scope of the protection of the right to a fair trial within each human rights framework which is 
interesting to compare.  
Article Art. 6(1) ECHR guarantees the right to a fair trial for ‘everyone’, ‘in the determination 
of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him’. The EU Charter on 
the other hand, guarantees the right to a fair trial to ‘everyone’ regardless of context. In this 
instance, the ECHR has a more restricted field of application, as the EU Charter does not 
require there to be a determination of civil rights and obligations or of criminal charge. 
According to the Explanations the lack of such a restriction in the EU Charter is explained by 
the fact that the Union is a ‘community based on the rule of law’, which means that the rule of 
law shall apply in every case.  
Consequently, an individual within the jurisdiction of an EU Member State may, in a dispute 
regarding his or her rights and freedoms guaranteed by Union law, have more extensive 
protection for the right to a fair trial in the EU Charter than in the ECHR.  
                                                
179  European  Commission,  ‘2015  report  on  the  application  of  the  EU  Charter  of  fundamental  rights’.  
Luxembourg  2016,  Publications  Office  of  the  European  Union,  p.27.  
180  Explanations  (n  74)  14.  
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3.3.2   A  Charter  Article  of  which  both  the  meaning  and  scope  correspond  
to  provisions  in  the  ECHR  
3.3.2.1   Prohibition  of  collective  expulsion  
This right, or State obligation, is governed in the EU Charter by Art. 19(1), which states that 
‘[c]ollective expulsions are prohibited’. According to the Explanations regarding Art. 19(1), 
this Article shall have the same meaning and scope as Protocol 4 Art. 4 ECHR, which also 
has the same wording.181  
When applying the Protocol 4 Art. 4 to the ECHR, Art. 13 ECHR on effective remedy and 
Protocol 7 Art. 1 on grounds for expulsion lay down procedural rules regulating how States 
may reach decisions in cases about expulsion of aliens.182 This means that when interpreting 
and applying the Charter Art. 19(1), Art. 13 ECHR and its Protocol 7 Art. 1 must be taken 
into consideration.  
However, since the EU Charter has its own provision on effective remedy (Art. 47(1)), it 
follows from the EU Charter Art. 51(2), and the fact that the Charter is primary law in the EU, 
while the ECHR is not, that Art. 47(1), rather than Art. 13 ECHR, should be applied when 
determining whether there has been a breach of the EU Charter Art. 19(1). As seen above, the 
scope of the EU Charter Art. 47(1) does not coincide entirely with that of Art. 13 ECHR. This 
means that although the meaning and scope of Art. 19(1) is the same as the right guaranteed 
by the ECHR, the procedural requirements may differ slightly when applying Art. 19(1) 
rather than Art. 13.  
Regarding the Protocol 7 Art. 1 to the ECHR, there is no corresponding provision in the EU 
Charter. Consequently, the content of this article must be inherent within the EU Charter Art. 
19(1), via its link to Protocol 4 Art. 4 of the ECHR and due to the EU Charter Art. 52(3).  
Thus, the level of protection is similar in this instance between the EU Charter and the ECHR, 
however, the procedural right differs in that it is somewhat more extensive under the Charter.  
                                                
181  For  the  EU  Member  States  Greece  and  the  United  Kingdom,  the  inclusion  of  this  Article  in  the  
Charter  increased  their  obligations  to  prohibit  collective  expulsion,  as  these  two  States  have  not  
ratified  ECHR  Protocol  4,  see  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner,  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  546,  section  19.06  
182  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner,  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  552-­553,  section  19.32.  
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However, in this situation, the internal market-based character of the Union may have a 
detrimental effect on the level of protection of the right. Guild mentions that the EU organ 
FRONTEX may assist Member States in carrying out returns, pursuant to denying asylum, 
using i.e. charter flights, to achieve greater efficiency and thus lower the costs. Since the 
Member States are paying for the plane tickets in advance, the right of the asylum seeker to 
have his or her application individually considered might be in jeopardy.183  
It should be noted that migration policy is not included in the EEA Agreement, an EU rules 
relating to this will therefore not apply within the EEA.184  
3.3.3   Charter  Articles  inspired  by  ECtHR  case  law  
3.3.3.1   The  right  to  have  access  to  legal  aid  
This right is governed by the EU Charter Art. 47(3) and Article 48(2). Article 47(3) states that 
legal aid shall be ‘made available to those who lack resources, in so far as such aid is 
necessary to ensure effective access to justice’. Article 48(2) guarantees respect for the rights 
of defence of anyone who has been charged with a criminal offence, and according to the 
Explanations,185 corresponds to Art. 6(3) ECHR and shall have the same meaning and scope.  
Within the ECHR the related provision regulating the right of legal aid is Art. 6(3) c, which 
only applies to are charged with a criminal offence. It states that such a person shall have the 
right to defend himself in person or through legal assistance or if he has not sufficient means, 
he shall be given such assistance free when the interests of justice so require. Consequently, 
under the ECHR the Contracting Parties are obliged to offer legal aid for those who cannot 
afford it in criminal cases “when the interests of justice so require”. Factors such as the 
accused’s ability to understand the case and to defend himself, as well as what is at stake for 
the accused, are relevant when deciding whether legal aid is required.186  
Article 47(3) of the EU Charter has no corresponding provision within the ECHR for civil 
disputes. However, a certain right to legal aid in civil disputes has been interpreted into Art. 
                                                
183  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner,  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  561  section  19.58.  
184  See  e.g.  E-­26/13  Íslenska  ríkiô  Atli  Gunnarson  [2014]  EFTA  Ct.  Rep.  254,  para.  74.  
185  Explanations  (n  74)  13.  
186  Case  of  Sdravko  Stanev  v  Bulgaria  App  no  32238/04  (ECtHR  6  November  2012),  para.  38  .  
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6(1) ECHR by the ECtHR, as seen in the case of Airey v. Ireland, in which the Court decided 
that if legal aid is necessary to ensure a fair trial, then the Contracting Party is obliged to 
provide it.187  
For civil disputes, legal aid may only be required in cases where the trial otherwise would be 
unfair or a lack of legal aid would hinder an ‘effective access to court’. As the Court points 
out in Airey v Ireland, other methods than legal aid may be sufficient to ensure a fair trial in 
civil cases, such as a simplified procedure.188  
In comparison Art. 47(3) of the EU Charter does not distinguish between civil and criminal 
cases. The Explanations on Art. 47(3) makes a reference to the case of Airey v Ireland, which 
means that the provision should be interpreted in light of ECtHR case law on the subject.189 
However, as the EU Charter Art. 52 states, EU law is not prevented from providing more 
extensive protection, which means that there is nothing hindering the EU Charter in also 
guaranteeing such a right in civil cases.  
Ward makes the point that the ECHR right to legal aid has been interpreted as being of an 
economic and social nature, whilst the EU Charter right, being included in the procedural 
chapter of the Charter, is of a procedural nature.190 This would mean that there would be 
necessary with different reasons to limit the respective rights.  
                                                
187  Case  of  Airey  v.  Ireland  App.  no.  6289/73  (ECtHR  9.  October  1979),  paras.  26-­28.  The  case  
concerned  a  woman  of  Irish  nationality  who  wanted  to  get  out  of  her  marriage  to  an  allegedly  violent  
and  alcoholic  man.  She  was  unable  to  attain  a  solicitor  willing  to  act  on  her  behalf  in  judicial  separation  
proceedings  because  she  would  not  be  able  to  pay  the  costs  involved.  The  Court  found  that  the  
national  process  for  separation  cases  required  the  parties  to  be  represented  by  a  solicitor  and  that  
although  the  ECHR  does  not  contain  provisions  guaranteeing  the  right  to  legal  aid  in  civil  disputes,  
ECHR  Art.  6(1)  did  in  this  case  require  the  State  of  Ireland  to  provide  the  woman  with  legal  aid.      
188  See  Airey  v  Ireland  (n  188),  para  26.  
189  See  also  DEB  (n  107)  paras  36  &  37.  
190Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner,  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  1272  paras  47.241-­242.  To  support  this  argument,  see  
the  inclusion  of  rules  on  legal  aid  within  the  Consolidated  Version  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  
European  Court  of  Justice  [2012]  OJ  L  265,  Chapter  4.  
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3.3.3.2   The  prohibition  of  expulsion  or  extradition  to  a  dangerous  State  
The EU Charter Article 19(2) states that no one may be ‘removed, expelled or extradited to a 
State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, 
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. According to the 
Explanations, this Article incorporates relevant case law from the ECtHR on Art. 3 ECHR, 
regarding non-refoulment.191  
In the ECHR, the right not to be sent to a dangerous State may be guaranteed by Art. 3 
ECHR, by which it is apparent that the EU Charter Art. 19(2) is inspired by, and thus 
presumably the content of the right is in accordance with Art. 3 ECHR. A difference between 
the two frameworks in this instance stems from the fact that a decision to expel an alien is not 
a ‘determination of a civil right or obligation or of a criminal charge’. Thus, under the ECHR, 
Art. 6 on fair trial will not apply to such cases. Art. 47 of the EU Charter however, applies to 
every right and freedom ‘guaranteed by law of the union’. Thus, the procedural rights 
regarding fair trial will be guaranteed in cases regarding expulsion under the Charter but not 
under the ECHR. 
Within the ECHR, Protocol 7 Art. 1 provides procedural rules for cases regarding expulsion. 
According to Protocol 7 Art. 1(1) letter (a) to (c) expulsion must be in accordance with law, 
and the alien shall be allowed to be heard on his reasons against the expulsion, shall have the 
right to have his case reviewed and shall be represented before the competent authorities for 
the abovementioned purposes. Consequently, the procedural rights are far more extensive 
under the EU Charter, as Art. 47 guarantees several more rights, among which to be heard by 
a Court.  
Further, Protocol 7 Art. 1(2) ECHR allows for expulsion without granting the procedural 
rights if ‘necessary in the interests of public order’ or ‘reasons of national security’. In 
comparison, the right to a fair trial under the EU Charter does not contain such additional 
limitation clauses.  
                                                
191  Ahmed  v  Austria  App  no  25964/94  (ECtHR  17  December  1996);;  Soering  v  the  UK  App  no  
14038/88  (ECtHR  07  July  1989).  
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Consequently, an asylum seeker will have better procedural safeguards for his or her case 
under the EU Charter than under the ECHR. Thus, the risk of arbitrariness is higher under the 
ECHR. 
3.3.4   A  charter  Article  inspired  by  EU  primary  legislation  
3.3.4.1   The  right  to  asylum  
Within the EU Charter Art. 18 protects the right to asylum. There is no corresponding right 
included in the ECHR and the praesidium that drafted the EU Charter had raised concern 
about including this Article in the Charter,192 thus extending this individual right to EU 
citizens.193  
According to the Explanations on Art. 18, the provision is based on the former EEC Art. 63 
(now Art. 78 TFEU), which eluded to the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.194 
Article 18 states that the Treaties and the Refugee Convention shall be given due respect. 
Article 1A of the Refugee Convention states that anyone who has a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or 
political opinion is a refugee. Presumably, this is also the definition adhered to in the EU 
Charter Art. 18.  
The Refugee Convention only recognises non-refoulment, and the right to seek but not enjoy 
asylum.195 The right to non-refoulment is guaranteed in the EU Charter by Art. 19(2), an it is 
thus evident that Art. 18 guarantees individuals the right to enjoy asylum, since it would 
otherwise would be left pointless. The Refugee Convention does however lay down the 
definition of a refugee and the content of the right.  
There is no such corresponding right in the ECHR, indeed the ECtHR has stated that the right 
to political asylum is not contained in either the ECHR or its Protocols. However,  as shown 
                                                
192  See  CHARTE  4284/00  CONVENT  8,  496-­528.  
193  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner,  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  531,  section  18.28.  
194  Geneva  Convention  Relating  to  the  Status  of  Refugees  [1951]  and  Protocol  Relating  to  the  Status  
of  Refugees  [1967]  .  
195  Refugee  Convention  (n  195)  Art.  33  cf.  Laurens  Lavrysen  ’European  Asylum  Law  and  the  ECHR:  
An  Uneasy  Coexistence’  (2011)  4  GoJIL  217,  223.  
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above, the expulsion of an asylum seeker may be in violation of Art. 3 ECHR.196 There is also 
prohibition of refoulment to death penalty.197  
Consequently, an asylum seeker has a better chance of acquiring asylum under the EU 
Charter than under the ECHR, because the Charter recognises a greater number of reasons for 
allowing asylum. Furthermore, the Charter recognises the right to asylum as an individual 
right, and not just as a right for a State to refuse extradition of a person to the state of their 
nationality, which has been the traditional understanding of asylum.198  
3.3.5   Charter  Articles  inspired  by  the  ECJ  case  law  and  by  Member  
States’  Constitutions  
3.3.5.1   Human  dignity  
Article 1 of the EU Charter states that ‘[h]uman dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and 
protected’. This right is based on ECJ case law,199 Member States’ Constitutions200 and the 
UDHR, which enshrines it in its preamble. Further, the EU Charter preamble recital 2 states 
that the Union is founded on inter alia dignity. This aligns with the fact that Art. 2 TEU now 
mentions human dignity as one of the Union’s founding values.  
Also two of the Charter Articles (Arts. 25 an 31) also mention dignity especially. Finally, 
Title 1 of the EU Charter is named ‘Dignity’, and it enshrines core human rights such as the 
right to life and the prohibition of slavery. According to the Explanations, none of the rights 
laid down in the Charter may harm the dignity of a person, and dignity must be respected 
even when a right is restricted. Thus, dignity plays a great part of EU fundamental rights and 
can indeed have an influence on all the rights therein. Most especially, it would be influential 
                                                
196  Vilvarajah  and  Others  v  the  United  Kingdom  App.  nos.  13163/87;;  13164/87;;  13165/87;;  13447/87;;  
13448/87  (ECtHR  30  October  1991)  para  102  and  103;;  Ahmed  v  Austria  App  no  25964/94  (ECtHR  17  
December  1996)  paras.  38  et  sec.  
197  Al-­Saadoon  and  Mufdhi  v.  the  United  Kingdom  App  no  61498/08  (ECtHR  2  March  2010),  para.  
120.  
198  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner,  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  530  section  18.27.  
199  Case  C-­377/98  Netherlands  v  European  Parliament  and  Council  [2001]  ECR  I-­7079  grounds  70-­
77.  
200  Blanke  &  Mangiameli  (eds)  (n  65)  11,  sections  01.17-­01.19.  
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on the core rights enshrined in the ‘Dignity’ section. However, being part of the foundation of 
the Union, it may also influence the other Charter Article. 
A search on the word dignity in ECJ case law in relation to fundamental rights from 2009 to 
March 2017, shows that dignity is often mentioned in relation to interpretation of EU 
legislation. However, the ECJ does not often attempt to map out the exact content of the right. 
The role of the right seems to be defined by each case.  
Within the ECHR, the only mention of dignity is in the preamble to Protocol 13 on 
prohibition against death penalty, which again is connected to the right to life. However, 
dignity does have a place in the case law of the ECtHR, where it is often used as support of an 
argument. In line with the EU Charter, the ECtHR often uses dignity arguments in relation to 
core rights such as the right to life and the prohibition of torture,201 but it has also influenced 
other rights, such as the right to freedom.202 Although the right is not as visible as in the EU 
Charter, the ECtHR has stated that it is ‘the very essence’ of the Convention.203 
One difference between the protection in the EU Charter and in the ECHR is that dignity 
seems to have a higher hierarchical status within the Charter. This might mean that dignity 
arguments may be used to the detriment of other rights, which might not happen in the 
ECHR. Dupré points out that it might affect end-of-life cases, in that Art. 1 of the Charter 
interpreted in accordance with Art. 2 may allow for an interpretation that it is a human right to 
live in dignity, and thus perhaps to die when that becomes impossible.204  
3.3.5.2   The  right  to  conscientious  objection  
The EU Charter Art. 10(1) corresponds to Art. 9 ECHR on the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. However, Art. 10(2) recognises the right to conscientious objection. 
The area of national defence is not really within the ECJ’s area of jurisdiction and violations 
of this provision may thus prove difficult to enforce.  
                                                
201  Jalloh  v  Germany  App  no  54810/00  (ECtHR  11  July  2006),  para  82.  
202  Yaroslav  Belousov  v  Russia  App  nos  2653/13  and  60980/14  (ECtHR  4  October  2016).  
203  Goodwin  v  the  UK  App  no  28957/95  (ECtHR  11  July  2002),  para.  90;;  Fernandes  de  Oliveira  v  
Portugal  App.  no.  78103/14  (ECtHR  28  March  2017),  para.  67.  
204  Blanke  &  Mangiameli  (eds)  (n  65)  16,  section  01.29.  
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However, including it into the Charter shows that it is a human right that the EU Member 
States should respect. No such corresponding right is included in the text of ECHR, but the 
ECtHR has concluded that the right to conscientious objection is protected under Art. 9 
ECHR.205 Consequently, the right to conscientious objection might be better protected under 
the ECHR, due to the limitation of the scope of EU law.  
3.3.6   A  Charter  Article  inspired  by  other  human  rights  sources  
3.3.6.1   Protection  of  the  elderly  
The protection of the elderly is guaranteed by the EU Charter Art. 25. Within the ECHR there 
is no Article expressively guaranteeing this right, but as will be seen below, there exists some 
protection for such rights also under that framework. 
According to the Explanations Art. 25 of the EU Charter draws on Art. 23 of the revised 
European Social Charter (“ESC”)206 and Arts. 24 and 25 of the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (“CFSRW”).207 Thus, presumably these three Articles 
and case law regarding them will be influential on the content of the EU Charter protection.  
Article 23 ESC states that the authorities must enable elderly to remain “full members of 
society for as long as possible”, and emphasises the possibility of living a decent life, having 
independency, suitable housing, health care and the respect for privacy and self-determination 
for those living in institutions. Articles 24 and 25 CFSRW guarantees respectively enough 
pension to provide for a “decent standard of living” after retirement or, if the individual does 
not have right to pension, sufficient recourses, medical and social assistance to respond to the 
individual’s needs.  
It is likely that this is close to the standard that will be set in the EU Charter as well.208 There 
is as of now little case law relating to the EU Charter Art. 25, and it will be up to the ECJ to 
deduct the standard provided by it.  
                                                
205  Bayatyan  v  Armenia  App  no  23459/03  (ECtHR  1  June  2011).  
206  European  Social  Charter  (1996)  ETS  163.  
207  Community  Charter  of  the  Fundamental  Social  Rights  of  Workers  [1989].  
208  Peers,  Hervey,  Kenner,  Ward  (eds)  (n  76)  700,  section  25.22.  
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There is no corresponding provision within the ECHR, however case law from the ECtHR 
shows that in questions regarding protection of the elderly, the ECtHR has often relied on Art. 
3 ECHR and sometimes Art. 2.209 Other provisions may come into play as well, depending on 
the case. 
A consequence of relying on Art. 3 ECHR is that the criteria for admissibility become 
thereafter. According to Art. 35(3)(a) ECHR, the ECtHR must declare inadmissible 
applications which are ‘manifestly ill-founded’. The criterion in Art. 3 is ‘torture or [...] 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, which means that the situation must be 
serious for the elderly applicant for the application to be admissible.210 Relying on Art. 2 will 
require a situation where the life of the elderly is at stake, or even lost.211 This might leave 
protection for rights of the elderly who are in a less extreme situation outside the control of 
the ECtHR. Furthermore, even if the application is not considered to be manifestly ill-
founded, the situation needs to be severe for the Court to decide that there has been a 
violation.  
Within the EU Charter there is as mentioned no corresponding admissibility provision. The 
admissibility criteria of the ECJ relates to the jurisdiction of the Court,212 locus standi of the 
applicant, and whether the time limit has been upheld.213 
As seen above, the standard guaranteed by the EU Charter cf. the ESC and the CFSRW is that 
the elderly must have several rights relating to dignity, as well as social and economic 
support, to amount to a ‘decent standard of living’. By comparison to the requirements 
according to Arts. 2 and 3 ECHR, the threshold for deciding that the right has been violated, 
is lower according to the EU Charter. The protection of rights of the elderly is stronger under 
the EU Charter than the ECHR. This is because the right has been better defined and elevated 
                                                
209  See  e.g.  Concil  of  Europe’s  Factsheet  ‘Elderly  People  and  the  European  Convention  on  Human  
Rights’  http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Elderly_ENG.pdf  
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as an important obligation of a state. Further, the emphasis on dignity in the EU Charter Art. 1 
may strengthen the protection.  
4   Concluding  Remarks    
Regarding the level of protection for human rights in the EU, the EU Charter seems to have 
succeeded in affording a higher level of protection than the ECHR for certain fundamental 
rights. This is in accordance with what the EU Charter Art. 52(3) foreshadowed. This has 
been achieved partly due to stronger procedural rights for applicants, for instance regarding 
Art. 47 of the EU Charter compared to Art. 6(1) ECHR.  
Another reason for the success is that certain social and solidarity rights which are not 
mentioned in the text of the ECHR, have been elevated by their explicit incorporation into the 
EU Charter. It should be mentioned that several rights not explicitly mentioned in the ECHR, 
are still protected by it, as illustrated by ECtHR case law. See for instance the situation 
regarding protection of the rights of the elderly, which under the ECHR is protected by Art. 3 
on torture and degrading or inhuman treatment. In the case of protection of the rights of the 
elderly, it is likely that Art. 3 affords somewhat less extensive protection than the EU Charter 
Art. 25.  
The context of the EU Charter being part of the EU should be noted, since the EU did not 
start out as a human rights foundation, but rather an economic cooperation. This might have a 
detrimental effect on the level of protection of human rights under the Charter, since 
economic interests are of great importance within the EU system.  
Regarding the scope of the frameworks, it is evident that the EU Charter guarantees 
protection for a wider range of rights. However, the level of protection guaranteed by some 
rights that do not have a corresponding right within the ECHR, may not be as high as for 
those protected within the ECHR. This is partly due to the fact that the EU Charter operates 
with ‘principles’, which are only to be ‘observed’, in contrast to ‘rights’, which are to be 
‘respected’.  
Another point is the fact that the ECtHR seems to associate ‘social’ rights with rights that are 
inherently derogable. It would make sense that social rights do not enjoy the same protection 
as those enshrined in the ECHR, since there presumably is less consensus among the EU 
Member States regarding the ‘additional’ rights of the EU Charter, than those which the 
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Member States have already adhered to through the ECHR. However, it does mean that the 
additional rights of the Charter may not enjoy as high a level of protection as the others.  
The possibility to derogate from rights within each framework is to a certain degree 
coinciding due to inter alia Art. 53(2) of the EU Charter. However, the derogation clauses 
within each framework are materially different. The EU Charter requires that national law 
provides for the derogation, which may rule out certain derogations at the outset. 
Furthermore, since no derogation may violate the essence of the rights and freedoms 
recognised therein, the freedom to derogate is further restricted. For instance, derogation 
violating human dignity as enshrined in the EU Charter Art. 1, would presumably not be 
allowed. The ECHR derogation clause protects the ECHR’s core rights by naming Articles 
from which there can be no derogation. A strength of the ECHR-method is that those rights 
are ensured absolutely, however, the more abstract term used in the EU Charter could 
possibly cover more ground, and could easily be interpreted in a dynamic fashion.   
Also in relation to the derogation clauses, it is necessary to point out that the EU might allow 
derogation based on economic interests. This is illustrated by the fact that derogation from the 
EU Charter is allowed only if the limitations meet the objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union.  
The lack of individual application procedure under the EU Charter makes it harder for the 
individual to ascertain his or her rights and obligations, since the applicant is depending on 
the relevant State to choose to make a preliminary reference. However, as illustrated above, 
an individual making an application to the ECtHR may have to wait for a substantial amount 
of time to get his or her case decided upon by the ECtHR. Furthermore, due to the structure of 
the EU, the ECJ has the power to decide that an act made by the EU organs is void, whereas 
the ECtHR may simply decide whether an Article of the ECHR has been violated. 
As far as the EEA organs go, the need for human rights control over their actions is not as 
great as for the EU organs, since there is no new legislation being produced by them. The test 
for respect for fundamental rights will be done by the EU Charter within the EU. The 
principle of homogeneity and the dynamic character of the EEA should also be helpful to 
ensure that any needed human rights considerations will be included in the application of the 
EEA.  
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However, situations could occur where the EFTA Court is making decisions in an area of law 
where the ECJ has so far been silent. In such cases, having had the EU Charter included as a 
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